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INTRODUCTION
In the late twentieth century, States around the world struck a Faustian
bargain. They concluded thousands of treaties among themselves, empowering
private arbitrators to hear disputes between States and foreign investors. States
surrendered some measure of sovereignty in order to assure investors that their
governments would not have the last word regarding the treatment of foreign
investments. Disputes that were once waged among States are now routinely
brought before investor-State arbitral tribunals. Chief Justice John Roberts of the
United States Supreme Court observed that in consenting to investor-State
dispute settlement (ISDS), a State "grants to private adjudicators not necessarily
of its own choosing . .. a power it typically reserves to its own courts, if it grants
it at all: the power to sit in judgment on its sovereign acts."I
The work of investment tribunals is sometimes compared to judicial
review; both require decision-makers to adjudicate the lawfulness of government
2
measures that affect the rights of private actors. However, ISDS finds private
persons in a fundamentally different place than does judicial review: investors
are not tied to a legal community in the same way that citizens are. The investor's
decision to invest is typically a sophisticated business decision that urns on the
host State's credible commitment. Investors are therefore not as reliant upon the
protective sheath of a judicial review-like process for their ights, particularly if
they have a credible threat of exit. For this reason, investment treaties are neither
bills of rights nor insurance policies.3
Yet, tribunals persistently draw upon the disciplinary, value-neutral
register of pacta sunt servanda and economic stability when they protect
investors' expectations of regulatory stability. Certainty about the content of
treatment obligations contributes to inflows of capital and promotes economic
development. Or so the theory goes. Nevertheless, there remains the widespread
belief that ISDS has an investor-friendly valence and that arbitrators consistently
resolve interpretive ambiguities against the interests of the very States that confer
authority upon them.4
This Note heralds a sovereigntist turn in international investment law. Its
point of departure is the "fair and equitable treatment" (FET) standard and the
controversial gloss that has been applied upon it by the doctrine of legitimate
expectations, which supposedly protects an investor's expectations against the
host State's infelicities. States are understandably discontented with the excesses
of the legitimate expectations doctrine. Their efforts to take back the reins by
rewriting the "legislation" of the international investment regime reflect a
struggle over the telos of ISDS and the role of States within it. The present reform
1. BG Group v. Republic of Argentina, 572 U.S. 25, 58 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
2. Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 58-68 (2007).
3. Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, ¶ 64
(Nov. 13, 2000).
4. See Olivia Chung, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its Effect on the
Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 953 (2007). But see Charles Brower & Stephen
Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 471 (2009).
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moment seeks a return to the sovereigntist roots of investment law. To hasten
that return, this Note looks to a method already familiar to international law:
binding joint interpretations. It argues that, in comparison to approaches such as
volitional self-restraint by arbitrators and treaty redesign, binding joint
interpretations are a way for States parties to collectively control the
interpretation of their treaties at all times, not just at times of treaty formation or
formal amendment.
Part I describes the origin and legal architecture of ISDS. In particular, it
examines the legal status of investors as rights-holders in international law and
disambiguates the so-called "right to regulate," a concept cloaked in mystery.
Part II ventures into the interpretive morass surrounding the legitimate
expectations doctrine and casts light upon its excesses. Part III evaluates current
efforts to respond to the legitimate expectations doctrine. Arbitrators have sought
to discipline their interpretations using public law standards of review. Several
discontented States have exited the ISDS system altogether. Other States,
meanwhile, have made quasi-legislative reforms to their investment treaties. Part
IV develops this Note's "sovereigntist fix" to reclaim a proper role for States in
the balance of interpretive authority. It shows that there is tried-and-tested
potential in binding joint interpretations established among States parties to limit
discretion available to arbitral tribunals.
I. THE ORIGINS AND ENDS OF INVESTOR-STATE DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT
A. Why Did States Sign Investment Treaties?
The story of ISDS must begin by explaining the following counterintuitive
trend: why did so many States sign investment treaties with ISDS provisions in
the late twentieth century, constraining their own sovereignty by delegating
authority to arbitral tribunals?
The rational choice explanation characterizes self-constraint as a solution
to a time-inconsistency problem. After foreign investors make sticky, capital-
intensive investment arrangements, host States subsequently have limited self-
disciplinary incentives without the credible threat of externally-imposed
punishment. ISDS creates a credible threat by providing a means of recourse to
foreign investors for pursuing substantive and procedural causes of action
against host States. In this account, self-constraint by delegation of dispute
resolution authority to third-party arbitrators serves as a rational response, a
means of signaling credible commitment to attract potential foreign investors.
As always, a historically sensitive explanation grounded in political
economy adds much-needed texture to the ahistorical rational choice story. There
is considerable evidence that investment treaties were signed by many
developing countries without a clear-eyed appreciation of consequences for their
regulatory autonomy and exposure to potential future liability. Lauge Poulsen
explains this phenomenon using a model of "bounded rationality" that led States
to underestimate the risk of liability for breaching investment treaty provisions.5
5. LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND EcoNOMIC DIPLOMACY:
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The proliferation of investment treaties also coincided with efforts by capital-
exporting States to encourage their capitalists to invest abroad by insuring them
against risks of adverse treatment. Treatment guarantees such as FET were
thought to be instrumental in securing the buy-in of potential foreign investors.
Following on the heels of early German bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
signed starting in 1959, many other capital-exporting States began their own BIT
programs in the 1960s and 1970s. Between then and the close of the twentieth
century, spurred on by the orthodoxy of capital and current account
liberalization, thousands of BITs were concluded with hasty deliberations and
almost identically-worded treaty provisions (at a rate of almost three new treaties
per week in the 1990s).6 These treaties were practically facsimiles of each other,
containing broad, unqualified substantive protections for investors. Most treaties
presently in force were concluded during this wave.
These two explanations have one very important characteristic in common:
they both acknowledge the fundamentally sovereigntist character of ISDS. The
regime was never founded with the intention of creating a general charter of
investors' rights. Yet, reading between the lines of today's arbitral jurisprudence,
one gets the distinct sense that the rights of host States and investors are
counterpoised in some imagined symmetrical relationship. Any account of
rights-holding in international investment law must address our unease with
thinking about States and investors as rights-holders of the same kind.
B. Pacta in Favorem Tertii and the "Right to Regulate"
Investment treaties were created by States, but the jury remains out on
whether treaties are for States. In other words, are investment treaties pacta in
favorem tertii (treaties concluded in favor of third parties)?7 An important
premise of this Note is that investment treaties are instruments of public
international law that. turn investors into rights-holders purposively and
contingently under the theory that juridifying investors' rights and protecting
their pocketbooks will buoy the economic well-being of the host State.8 ISDS
was conceived to meet the sovereigntist end of encouraging foreign investment,9
but it could only do so by turning investors into a class of rights-holders.10
THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT TREATIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 44-45 (2015). Poulsen's theory also
attributes the stickiness of "default treaty designs"- even after their shortcomings became clear-to
dysfunction in developing country bureaucracies.
6. UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2017: INVESTMENT AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
111 (2017) [hereinafter UNCTAD 2017 Report].
7. See, for example, the position adopted by W. Michael Reisman in the arbitration between
Ecuador and the United States. Republic of Ecuador v. United States, Case No. 2012-5, Opinion with
Respect to Jurisdiction in the Interstate Arbitration Initiated by Ecuador Against the United States, ¶ 3(a),
(Apr. 24, 2012) (arguing that investment treaties are "a species of treaties for the benefit of third parties")
[hereinafter Reisman Ecuador-U.S. Expert Opinion].
8. This instrumentalist characterization sometimes implicitly appears in the reasoning of
investment tribunals. See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 23 (Sept. 25, 1983), 23 I.L.M. 351, 369 (1984) ("To protect investments is to
protect the general interest of development and of developing countries.").
9. See Herman Abs & Hartley Shawcross, Comment on the Draft by Its Authors, The Proposed
Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment: A Roundtable, 9 J. PUB. L. 115, 119 (1960).
10. Traditional international law does not have a well-developed grammar of rights and duties
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Investors might therefore be compared to third-party beneficiaries in
contract law, who enjoy more narrowly-circumscribed rights than do States
parties to investment treaties. Unlike human rights treaties-standard examples
of pacta in favorem tertii-that "treatify" rights believed to inhere in human
beings, foreign investors do not have freestanding entitlements to the rights
created by investment treaties. In the event of a conflict, the interests and
sovereign prerogatives of States should take precedence over the third-party
beneficiary rights created by investment treaties. Doing otherwise would
conflate the means of investment law-vesting rights in investors-with its
sovereigntist ends. These issues, far from being theoretical abstractions, are
deeply implicated in efforts to reform ISDS.
There is no doubt, of course, that a sovereign State has some inalienable
right to regulate. The rights of investors are more contingent, an artifact of
economic expediency. But as States rush headlong to vindicate their regulatory
competence through treaty reform, it becomes important to clarify: exactly what
kind of legal entitlement is the right to regulate?
There is a centrifugal bent to these discussions: that is, commentators insist
on describing alternative conceptions of the right to regulate. One common
move, seen in the public law doctrine of "margin of appreciation," is to imagine
that States have some finite amount of regulatory space, leaving ambiguous how
much "space" States are entitled to."1  Another popular trope is zero-sum
balancing between the investors' rights and the host State's right to regulate.
Proportionality analysis, a source of confusion among tribunals and
commentators, invokes a balancing act of this kind.12
The concept of regulatory space and the balancing metaphor are not
incompatible; they merely capture two different legal relations often subsumed
under the right to regulate. If it makes sense at all to describe States' regulatory
competences as rights in the formal sense, such rights inhere in the State's
sovereignty. The legal fiction of a circumscribed right to regulate captures the
State's effort to solve a time-inconsistency problem through credible
commitment and costly signaling; in other words, it juridifies an economic
relationship between investors and States by giving it legal form. Indeed, as Part
II shows, even tribunals that recognize an expansive version of the legitimate
expectations doctrine might gesture at a putative "right to regulate" before
promptly restricting it in the name of the investor's expectations.
when describing legal relations between States and non-State actors. Older debates, which fixated on
whether investors were "subjects" of international law, have become obsolete; international lawyers and
jurists now agree that corporate investors have a "limited international legal personality." ANDREW
CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 79 (2006).
11. See generally Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law,
54 VA. J. INT'L L. 545 (2014) (challenging the suitability of the margin of appreciation in the adjudication
of investment disputes).
12. See generally Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Public Law Concepts to Balance
Investors' Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest - The Concept ofProportionality,
in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 75-104 (Stephan W. Schill ed.,
2010) (describing the task of tribunals to resolve conflicts between investment protection and competing
public policy concerns).
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C. Towards a Sovereigntist Turn in International Investment Law
Anthea Roberts has observed that arbitral jurisprudence "frequently
resembles a house of cards built largely by reference to other tribunal awards and
academic opinions, with little consideration of the views and practices of states
in general or treaty parties in particular."1 3 For some observers, investment law's
alienation from its sovereigntist origins is reason enough for a course
correction.14 By contrast, several scholars and seasoned arbitrators have objected
that even if international investment law has become preoccupied with investors'
rights and expectations to the perceived exclusion of the concerns of respondent
States, on balance, robust investor protections represent an economic boon for
host States by increasing the supply of foreign investment and lowering the costs
of credible commitment.'5
This Note's normative commitment to dismantling the house of cards so as
to reclaim the primacy of States in the architecture of investment law is based on
three further considerations that sometimes get lost in debates over the proper
role of the State. First, in puzzling at how to effectuate a sovereigntist turn, this
Note recognizes the practical reality that, as detailed in Part III, a groundswell of
sovereigntist responses to jurisprudential developments in investment law is
already under way and that academic efforts would be more productively
directed towards addressing how best to channel discontent into tractable
reforms aimed at recentralizing State authority. Second, the intuition that robust
protections for foreign investors are conducive to increased foreign investment
and economic development does not obviously counsel against returning to
investment law's sovereigntist origins. To begin with, empirical studies of the
argument that States attract investment by including self-constraining
substantive provisions in investment treaties paint a mixed picture. It is dubious
that recalibrating investment treaty commitments will eviscerate foreign
investment into any given State, particularly when many other States are
undertaking similar reforms. Such economic arguments also often elide political
value judgments, which assume that States are in the best place to adjudicate for
13. Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion i Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role
ofStates, 104 AM. J. INT'L L. 179, 179 (2010).
14. See M. SORNARAiAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 110-70 (4th ed.
2017) (arguing that control over foreign investment is a "right that flows from sovereignty" and, therefore,
that States have inherent authority to take measures in the public interest notwithstanding investment
treaty commitments); Andreas Kulick, Reassertion of Control: An Introduction, in REASSERTION OF
CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME (Andreas Kulick ed., 2017) (documenting both the
sidelining of public interest issues in comparison to investor rights and growing efforts to correct that
disparity); Detlev Vagts, Introduction to THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY xxxvii-li (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (describing criticism against
investment law's perceived biases in favor of business interests and capital-exporting States and proposals
for potential reform).
15. See, e.g., Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard,. What's in a Meme? The Truth About
Investor-State Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (2014); Stephen M. Schwebel, In Defense ofBilateral Investment Treaties, 31 ARB.
INT'L 181 (2015).
16. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration,
50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 435 (2009); J.W. Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct
Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397 (2011).
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themselves; it is not obvious that every State would elect to maximize foreign
investment at the expense of being hamstrung in exercising regulatory autonomy
or in meeting their public interest objectives. Finally, there is no reason to insist
upon a one-size-fits-all approach. States with different political commitments
and appetites for foreign investment should have the wherewithal to calibrate
(and importantly, to recalibrate) their investment treaties to reflect mutually
agreed upon compromises between reserving room for maneuver and signaling
credible commitment. The binding joint interpretations described in Part IV are
a promising but presently under-utilized way in which States may be able to do
so.
II. LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS: AN INTERPRETIVE MORASS
Investment treaties are "maddeningly imprecise"17 and replete with open-
textured provisions that can sustain a wide range of understandings.'8 Tribunals
reinvent the wheel all the time. The concerns motivating this Note and the
"sovereigntist fix" it develops are not particular to the legitimate expectations
doctrine. Yet the excesses of the doctrine provide arguably the most important
case study in arbitral jurisprudence. This is because it has become de rigueur for
tribunals to inquire into whether the actions of host States might have frustrated
the legitimate expectations of investors when adjudicating the host State's
compliance with obligations to accord FET, which is litigated in the
overwhelming majority of investment treaty disputes. Venturing into the thicket
of legitimate expectations, one finds that the contours of doctrine reveal
themselves to be constraints upon the host State's sovereignty at the outer limits
of the FET obligation.
A. Fair and Equitable Treatment and the Provenance ofLegitimate
Expectations
1. Fair and Equitable Treatment
There is considerable disagreement over what the simple-seeming
obligation to accord "fair and equitable treatment" means.20 If modern
investment law has turned the investor into a rights-holder entitled to some level
17. APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 45 n.23 (Karl P. Sauvant
ed., 2008) (citing William D. Rogers, Emergence of the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes as the Most Significant Forum for Submission of Bilateral Investment Treaty
Disputes, Presentation at the Inter-American Development Bank Conference (Oct. 26-27, 2000)).
18. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 133 (2008); Lucy Reed, The De Facto Precedent Regime in Investment Arbitration, 25 ICSID REV.
95, 96-97 (2010).
19. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005)
20. Saluka Invs. BV (Neth. v. Czech Republic), Partial Award, ¶ 284 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib.
Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Saluka Partial Award]; see also ADF Group Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, ¶ 184 (Jan. 9, 2003) [hereinafter ADF Award]. For a discussion of different
formulations of FET, see U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Fair and Equitable Treatment:
UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5 (2012) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment].
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of protection at the hands of the host State, FET is the textual wellspring from
which many of those rights flow. Andrew Blandford's prehistory of
contemporary FET jurisprudence describes a centuries-long gestation through
which the bedrock principles of "justice and equity" asserted by Emer de Vattel
and other progenitors of public international law developed into early twentieth-
century characterizations of the so-called international minimum standard (IMS)
of treatment for aliens.21 The 1926 award of the US-Mexican Claims
Commission in Neer v. Mexico is the canonical expression of the IMS: "[T]he
treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should
amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency
of governmental action so far short of international standards that every
reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency."22 Since
the postwar period, treatment standards such as IMS or FET have been
ubiquitous in international economic law.23
FET is the most important lens through which to follow the unfolding story
of international investment law.24 First, FET is a mainstay of this body of law;
almost every investment treaty contains an FET provision.25 It is therefore
described as the "most important standard"26 or "grundnorm"27 in the investment
treaty system. Second, facially similar FET clauses have been given an enormous
range of interpretations.28 These two factors are related: as increasing numbers
of tribunals have differently interpreted this ubiquitous clause, the interpretive
haze surrounding it has thickened.29 Third, precisely because FET is an elastic,
open-textured standard, "it is the most often invoked treaty standard in [ISDS],
present in almost every single claim brought by foreign investors against host
States.,30 Finally, the future of FET jurisprudence is cloaked in uncertainty.
21. Andrew C. Blandford, The History of Fair and Equitable Treatment Before the Second
World War, 32 ICSID REV. 287, 289 (2017).
22. L.F.H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 60, 61-62 (U.S.-
Mex. Gen. Claims Comm'n Oct. 15, 1926).
23. See, e.g., Economic Agreement of Bogota art. 22, May 2, 1948,21 OAS Treaty Series; INT'L
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Draft International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments (1949);
Herman Abs & Hartley Shawcross, Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (Abs-Shawcross Draft
Convention) 1 (1959).
24. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 18, at 130; SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE BIT
GENERATION 294 (2009); UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 20, at 1.
25. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. 803, 847, 1 39 (Dec. 12) (separate
opinion of Higgins, J.) (listing FET among "legal terms of art well known in the field of overseas
investment protection").
26. Peter T. Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 3, 24 (Peter T. Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).
27. J.W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 219 (2010).
28. See Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today's Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA J.
INT'L L. 7 (2013); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Unified Theory ofFair and Equitable Treatment, 43 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. POL. 43 (2010).
29. Christopher Campbell, House of Cards: The Relevance of Legitimate Expectations Under
Fair and Equitable Treatment Provisions in Investment Treaty Law, 30 J. INT'L ARB. 361, 364 (2016)
("[FET] has become the twenty-first century's version of John Selden's equity . .. varying according to
the size of the Chancellor's foot.").
30. Katia Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, in ARBITRATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 385-86 (Katia Yannaca-Small
ed., 2010).
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Arbitral tribunals "routinely take into account and balance public interests, even
in sensitive policy areas once thought to be inarbitrable . .. through dynamic
construction of [FET]," which has become "the doctrinal site of recurrent
skirmishes in an intensifying war of authority between arbitrators and states."3'
2. Legitimate Expectations
The legitimate expectations doctrine is a legal transplant with public law
origins in English administrative law.32 In public law, due process considerations
justify giving legal force to some subset of private actors' "legitimate"
expectations with respect to governmental conduct, such as ensuring consistent,
non-discriminatory application of law or enforcing representations that are made
with sufficient specificity to justify reliance. As applied to investment law, the
doctrine has now been understood to create protections for foreign investors'
substantive expectations (the right to a particular legal framework's stability) as
well as their procedural expectations (the right to a particular kind of State
conduct in legislation or regulation).33 However, the transplantation of legitimate
expectations doctrine into investment law appears to be both thinly rationalized
and poorly adapted to the different relationship between States and subjects
(investors), as compared to public law.
There are two jurisprudential problems within the legitimate expectations
doctrine that must be untangled. The first is that at its outer limits, the doctrine
goes too far when tribunals misconstrue "legitimate expectations" to read a
make-believe stabilization clause guaranteeing "a stable legal and business
environment" into FET provisions.34 As the remainder of this Section explains,
this misunderstanding has been endemic to the legitimate expectations doctrine
since its very origins. The second is the problem of interpretive drift,35 which is
taken up in Section II.B. The legitimate expectations doctrine has strayed and
frayed over time. The doctrine, as it stands today, is the haphazard result of
strategic moves, linguistic ambiguity, misapprehensions about the nature of the
31. ALEC STONE SWEET & FLORIAN GRISEL, THE EvOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: JUDICIALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY 171 (2017).
32. CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 234 (2007); Teerawat Wongkaew, The Transplantation of
Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Critique, in THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 69 (Shaheeza Lalani & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo eds., 2015).
33. Michele Potesta, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding the
Roots and the Limits ofa Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID REV. 88, 95 (2013).
- 34. See LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/01, Decision on
Liability, IM 124-25 (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter LG&E Decision] (containing nearly identical language);
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 274 (May 12,
2005) [hereinafter CMS Gas Award]; see also Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 99 (Aug. 30, 2000) [hereinafter Metalclad Award]; Occidental Exploration
& Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, Final Award, TT 183-96 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. July 1, 2004).
35. By using the term "interpretive drift," this Note does not suggest that the legitimate
expectations doctrine started in one place and ended up in another. Other terms, such as "interpretive
dispersion" might capture other aspects of the problem. When interpretations drift away from what was
originally intended by States parties, States can more readily pick up on interpretive trends and act to
clarify their original intent, as proposed in Part IV. Interpretive dispersion is more challenging to detect
and respond to. The legitimate expectations doctrine has been shaped by both kinds of effects.
2019] 323
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
State in its capacity as a disputant, and the political preferences of particular
arbitrators. Even after attempts by several tribunals to rein in interpretive drift,
there remain outliers to be washed out.
The legitimate expectations doctrine arguably took root in Tecmed v.
Mexico.36 The Tecmed award held that FET required "treatment hat does not
affect the basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor
... [who] expects the host State to act in a consistent manner... ." It rooted
this understanding in "the bonafide principle recognized in international law,"
stretching and upending prevailing understandings of good faith by giving legal
effect to investors' expectations. In a sharp and succinct critique, the MTD v.
Chile Annulment Committee questioned Tecmed's account of State obligations
derived from investors' expectations, suggesting that stepping outside the
agreed-upon treaty-based obligations may be grounds for annulment for manifest
excess of powers. As James Crawford has written: "[T]he doctrine of legitimate
expectations should not be used as a substitute for the actual arrangement, agreed
between the parties, or as a supervening and overriding source of the applicable
law." 40
Tecmed's attenuated reasoning has been no deterrent to tribunals that have
adopted its standard. In his widely-cited separate opinion in International
Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Thomas Walde traced the
"significant growth in the role and scope of the legitimate expectation principle,
from .. . a subsidiary interpretative principle ... [to] a self-standing subcategory
and independent basis for a [FET] claim." 4 1 Walde acknowledged that tribunals
in early cases such as Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Tecmed,
Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador,42 Waste
Management II,43 and MTD "may not have explained the doctrinal background
of the principle, its scope and contours specifically."44 Indeed, each award's
discussion of the legitimate expectations doctrine relies on Tecmed without
critically evaluating or even reproducing Tecmed's move of locating the
legitimate expectations doctrine in the general obligation of bona fide state
36. Tdcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter Tecmed Award].
37. Id. 154.
38. Id. 153.
39. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Decision on
Annulment, $ 67 (Mar. 21, 2007) [hereinafter MTD Annulment] ("A tribunal which sought to generate
from [investors'] expectations a set of rights different from those contained in or enforceable under the
[investment treaty] might well exceed its powers, and if the difference were material might do so
manifestly."); see also EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 216-
17 (Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter EDF Award] (hazarding against overstating the conclusion that "legitimate
expectations . .. imply the stability of the legal and business framework.").
40. James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT'L 351, 374
(2008).
41. International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Separate Opinion by
Thomas WtIde, ¶ 37 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Dec. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Wdlde Separate Opinion].
42. Metalclad Award, supra note 34; Tecmed Award, supra note 36; Occidental Exploration &
Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, supra note 34.
43. Waste Management v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award
(Apr. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Waste Management].
44. Wlde Separate Opinion, supra note 41, $ 37.
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conduct. Nevertheless, less than three years after Tecmed, the seminal Saluka v.
Czech Republic award declared in 2006 that "the notion of legitimate
expectations . . . [was] the dominant element of [the FET] standard."4 5 Writing
that same year, Zachary Douglas observed that "the fierce competition among
arbitral tribunals to author a pithy single-paragraph proclamation of what [FET]
actually means for posterity has, for the time being, produced a fortuitous
winner-the so-called Tecmed standard. . "46
B. Interpretive Drift in Legitimate Expectations Doctrine
Does the legitimate expectations doctrine present serious interpretive
problems, or does this Note make much ado about nothing? Taking as given that
legal rules should aspire to be clear and concrete, the legitimate expectations
doctrine can be problematized because ambiguity runs through to its very core.
Whereas most tribunals correctly recognize as "legitimate" only those
expectations that rell' on specific undertakings by governments that induce
detrimental reliance, 7 others interpret general legislation or even statements
made to the public or to potential investors as expectation-generating
48commitments. Understanding how the aperture of the legitimate expectations
doctrine has widened to permit this range of interpretations requires tracing the
doctrine's development from its early articulation (in Tecmed and its progeny)
to the doctrine as it is understood and applied today.
If the legitimate expectations doctrine was misconceived to begin with, its
subsequent evolution has been further marred by interpretive drift. W. Michael
Reisman has raised "the concern that no matter how carefully a provision is
drafted, the intended meaning of key and recurring terms drifts, over the course
of serial arbitrations, away from what was originally intended by the states
parties."49 Because thousands of investment treaties share "recurring and often
identical" language,
45. Saluka Partial Award, supra note 20, ¶ 302.
46. Zachary Douglas, Nothing If Not Critical for Investment Treaty Arbitration: Occidental,
Eureko and Methanex, 22 ARB. INT'L 27, 27 (2006) (internal quotations omitted).
47. See e.g., Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, Decision on
Liability, ¶ 117 (Dec. 27,2010); Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction
and Liability, ¶ 284 (Jan. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Lemire Decision]; Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v.
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, ¶ 340 (Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Duke
Energy Award]; PSEG Global, Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, TT 241-
42 (Jan. 19, 2007); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶¶ 766-67 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June
8, 2009) [hereinafter Glamis Gold Award]; Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States,
Award, ¶ 141 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Grand River Award]; CME Czech
Republic B.V. (The Neth.) v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 611 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Sept. 13,
2001).
48. See e.g., Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision on
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 7.78 (Nov. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Electrabel Decision];
Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, T 264 (May 22, 2007); Sempra
Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, In 303 (Sept. 28, 2007); CMS
Gas Award, supra note 34, ¶277 (May 12, 2005); National Grid plc v. Argentine Republic, Award¶ 176-
79 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 3, 2008); Saluka Partial Award, supra note 20, ¶ 329.
49. W. Michael Reisman, Negotiating Investment Treaties: Mechanisms for Anticipating and
Controlling Textual Drift 1 (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 546, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=2789796.
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The result is a cumulative process of textual elaboration and 'layering' . . . feed[ing]
into an ongoing process of shaping and reshaping treaty terms, sometimes leading to
deviation from . .. the states-parties' understanding and expectation of the meaning
of those terms. So, though there are psycho-linguistic and even philosophical reasons
for all textual drift, international investment agreements are peculiarly vulnerable to
*50
it.
Alec Stone Sweet and Florian Grisel have explained how such drift
explains the trajectory of the legitimate expectations doctrine. Early investment
agreements contained "virtually no guidance" on FET interpretation.5
Unfettered by textual restrictions, claimants pled indirect expropriation and FET
on "essentially the same facts."52 Tribunals relied heavily "on the covering
principle of [legitimate expectations] to manage situations wherein an investor
has relied on ex ress guarantees given by the state to induce the investment in
the first place." A number of authoritative judgments, "[w]ritten by renowned
jurists and former judges of major international courts" provided "sophisticated
commentary on [legitimate expectations] as a general principle of law." 54 An
investor's legitimate expectations came to "include an entitlement to some
minimum level of stability in the regulatory environment, and more if expressly
promised by the state to induce the investment in the first place."5 5 Stone Sweet
and Grisel conclude that "tribunals, in the absence of any express state consent,
purposefully read into the FET both the doctrine of 'legitimate expectations' and
the state's 'right to regulate'. Arbitrators did not camouflage their lawmaking."56
In the subtext of this story is an under-emphasized point: although it is clear
that the legitimate expectations doctrine has some basis in general principles of
public law recognized in most major legal traditions, its content is subject to
contestation and change.57 Interpretive drift is a consequence of the difficulty
associated with laying down concrete, enforceable outer limits to obligations
founded upon general principles of law.
The resulting legal uncertainty has a number of practical consequences.
Although the legal form of ISDS masks its economic function as a form of
credible commitment in investor-State relations, uncertainty regarding the scope
of applicable investment treaty obligations can prove costly and undesirable for
various participants in ISDS. The most important worry is "regulatory chill"-
the possibility that the threat of investment disputes might discourage regulation
in the public interest.5 8 A similar concern is investment chill attributable to
50. Id.at4.
51. STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 3 1, at 192.
52. Id. at 195.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 196.
55. Id. at 197.
56. Id. at 198.
57. See Chester Brown, The Protection of Legitimate Expectations as a 'General Principle of
Law': Some Preliminary Thoughts, 6 TRANSNAT'L DisP. MGMT 1 (2009); Elizabeth Snodgrass,
Protecting Investors' Legitimate Expectations - Recognizing and Delimiting a General Principle, 21
ICSID REV. 21 (2006); Wongkaew, supra note 32.
58. There is a small but growing body of literature providing evidence of such regulatory chill.
See, e.g., Gus Van Harten & Dayna Nadine Scott, Investment Treaties and the Internal Vetting of
Regulatory Proposals: A Case Study from Canada, 7 J. INT'L DisP. SETTLEMENT 92 (2016) (concluding
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investors' uncertainty. Although investors are not always natural objects of
sympathy, reduced foreign investment due to risk-aversion is injurious to States
that might otherwise have been beneficiaries of the foregone investment. Finally,
there is also an optical dimension: interpretive drift is problematic because it saps
ISDS' already-beleaguered legitimacy.
Philip Morris' challenge of Uruguay's tobacco packaging regulations5-
arguably the most publicly prominent and controversial investment dispute in
recent years-illustrates both lingering uncertainty about the legitimate
expectations doctrine and how that uncertainty might cast a pall over regulation
in the public interest.60 In Philip Morris Brands v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay
(Philip Morris Uruguay), both parties accepted a notional right to regulate but
disputed the "acceptable margin of change."61 Philip Morris relied on the
legitimate expectations doctrine, arguing that Uruguay was required to maintain
a stable legal and regulatory framework. Uruguay objected that its anti-tobacco
regulations "amounted to a reasonable, good faith exercise of [its] sovereign
62
prerogatives" to protect its citizens' health. The tribunal agreed, but without a
principled distinction with respect to awards upholding the legitimate
expectations doctrine.63 It simply held that the FET obligation did not preclude
Uruguay from "enacting novel rules. . . provided these have some rational basis
and are not discriminatory. [FET] does not guarantee that nothing should be done
by the host State for the first time."6 Rather than seizing a valuable opportunity
to clarify the outer limits of the legitimate expectations doctrine, the Philip
Morris Uruguay tribunal sidestepped the question altogether. It therefore
remains unclear whether a different tribunal confronted with similar facts has the
discretion to conclude that even State actions to protect public health, such as
anti-smoking legislation, might frustrate investors' legitimate expectations and
give rise to a compensation obligation.
The Vattenfall fiasco in Germany further illustrates how the legitimate
expectations doctrine might threaten public interest regulation. In the summer
following the Fukushima Daiichi meltdown in 2011, the German Bundestag,
citing public safety and environmental concerns, passed legislation to phase out
nuclear energy production by 2022. Germany's atomaussteig (nuclear exit)
backpedaled upon an earlier decision by Chancellor Angela Merkel's
government to delay the termination of the national nuclear energy program.
from interviews with environmental regulators that the risk of ISDS disputes actively chilled regulation);
Sabrina Tavernise, Tobacco Industry Tactics Limit Poorer Nations' Smoking Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2013 (suggesting that Namibia, Gabon, Togo, and Uganda were all warned off implementing stricter
tobacco regulation), https://nyti.ms/1dvsmav.
59. Philip Morris Brands v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/I0/7, Award
(July 8, 2016) [hereinafter Philip Morris Uruguay Award].
60. See Harold Hongju Koh, Global Tobacco Control as a Health and Human Rights
Imperative, 57 HARV. INT'L L.J. 433 (2016).




65. In 2010, Chancellor Merkel amended the Atomic Energy Act, postponing the termination
of phase-out efforts initiated by the Social Democrats and the Greens in 2002.
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The Swedish State-owned nuclear energy company Vattenfall pursued both
investor-State arbitration and a constitutional challenge on the theory that
Germany's volte face had frustrated its legitimate expectations in regulatory
66stability. Although the international arbitration was ultimately settled,
Germany's Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) found that Germany had violated
67Vattenfall's legitimate expectations. 6 The German public reacted with righteous
indignation.
While acknowledging the "particular weight" of "public interest grounds"
and the "paramount importance" of an accelerated phase-out, the FCC defaulted
to the orthodox position that the government had to provide "at least an
entitlement to adequate compensation."69 According to this kind of argument,
States are never prevented from regulating; rather, States are merely obliged to
pay compensation when investors' legitimate expectations are frustrated. This is
analogous to the concept of "efficient breach" in contract law and reflects the
growing sense that a principle of "efficient noncompliance" is overdue in
international law.70 Adherents gloss over the fact that owing to valuation
problems and the enormous discretion that tribunals enjoy at the quantum
(damages) stage, awards may "misprice" breaches and grant excessive
compensation to investors.7 ' More findamentally, this move illustrates the
obfuscation of the general presumption in ISDS that States are entitled to
"regulatory flexibility." 7 2
Context also plays an under-appreciated role in the legitimate expectations
doctrine. In the memorable words of the WTO Appellate Body, disputes in
international economic law touch "human societies as they actually exist in the
real world, where people live, work and die." 73 However, the role and limits of
contextual analysis remains unclear. Duke Energy v. Ecuador, for example,
imposed a two-key burden upon the investor bringing a legitimate expectations
claim, requiring both investment-inducing assurances leading to detrimental
reliance and an assessment of the "reasonableness" or "legitimacy" of investors'
expectations that takes into account "political, socioeconomic, cultural and
66. See, e.g., Laura Yvonne Zielinski, "Legitimate Expectations" in the Vattenfall Case: At
the Heart of the Debate over ISDS, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Jan. 10, 2017), http://arbitrationblog
.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/0 1/1 0/legitimate-expectations-in-the-vattenfall-case-at-the-beart-of-the-
debate-over-isds.
67. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 6, 2016, 143
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERWALTUNGSOERICHT [BVERFGE] 246, 2017 (Ger.) [hereinafter
German Federal Constitutional Court], https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Entscheidungen/EN/2016/12/rs2Ol6i206_lbvr282111en.html.
68. Zielinski, supra note 66.
69. German Federal Constitutional Court, supra note 67, ¶f 380-382.
70. Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, Efficient Breach ofInternational Law: Optimal Remedies,
'Legalized Noncompliance,' and Related Issues, 110 MICH. L. REV. 243, 246 (2011).
71. Joshua B. Simmons, Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration, 30 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 196,
198-99 (2012); see also Louis T. Wells, Double Dipping in Arbitral Awards? An Economist Questions
Damages Awarded to KarahaBodas Company in Indonesia, 19 ARB. INT'L 471,478 (2003) ("[E]xcessive
awards discourage government takings, or breach of contract, when such actions are in fact efficient and
thus desirable."). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 108 (3d ed. 1986).
72. See, e.g., Electrabel Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 7.77.
73. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
1 187, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1998).
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historical conditions prevailing in the host State."74
Claimants are typically sophisticated investors who can and should remain
abreast of regulatory patterns in the normal course of business. Normatively and
doctrinally, it is well-accepted that the legitimate expectations doctrine should
not insure claimants against all contingencies. Tribunals have found the
frustration of investors' expectations not to be actionable where their
investments were made under circumstances such as political volatility,75
economic malaise,76  changing geopolitical priorities,7 7  post bellum
reconstruction,78 or in "a renascent independent s ate, coming rapidly to grips
with the reality of modem financial, commercial and banking practices."79 Led
by the arbitrators who delivered the widely-acclaimed Methanex v. United States
award, some tribunals have held that claimants do not have a legitimate
expectation in the fixity of environmental regulation in light of growing
environmentalism and legislative lobbying by interest groups.80 Yet tribunals are
more cautious and, resultantly, more inconsistent when considering context that
does not present overwhelming exogenous circumstances or discernible political
trends or regulatory schemes.8 1 Investors' conduct is another area of uncertainty.
Some scholars advocate "assessing the conduct of investors towards the
community on behalf of which the State may act."82 For the most part, however,
tribunals are largely inattentive to investor conduct, entrenching investors' rights
without creating concomitant responsibilities.
To some minds, if context justifies the frustration of legitimate
expectations, States are placed in a position of full sovereignty without full
responsibility. However, this critique makes sovereignty conditional upon the
fulfilment of responsibilities to the international community. This idea rightly
has very little purchase within investment law or, for that matter, outside it. A
more reasonable position might be that context usefully informs whether an
74. Duke Energy Award, supra note 47, T 340.
75. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/29, Award, T$ 193-194 (Aug. 27, 2009).
76. Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, Award, 165(c) (July 26, 2001).
77. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award,
¶ 335 (Sept. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Parkerings Award].
78. Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12,
Award, ¶M 241-45 (June 7, 2012).
79. Genin v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, ¶ 348 (June 25, 2001)
[hereinafter Genin Award].
80. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award, pt. IV, ch. D, ¶ 9 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.
Aug. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Methanex Final Award]; see also Philip Morris Uruguay Award, supra note
59, T 430 (observing the "progressively more stringent regulation of... tobacco products"); Glamis Gold
Award, supra note 47, TT 767, 800 (discussing California's increased sensitivity to open-pit mining).
81. See, e.g., Sadie Blanchard, Legal Certainty During EU Accession: What Can a Foreign
Investor in a Future Member State Legitimately Expect?, in TOWARDS A UNIVERSAL JUSTICE? PUTTING
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND JURISDICTIONS INTO PERSPECTIVE 290 (Dirio Moura Vicente ed., 2015)
(discussing inconsistent decisions in the Micula, Eastern Sugar, AES, and Electrabel cases over regulatory
measures taken to facilitate accession to the European Union).
82. Peter Muchlinski, Caveat Investor? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor Under the
Fair and Equitable Standard, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 527, 534 (2008).
83. But see Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Award,
¶ 602 (Dec. 8, 2016) ("The protection of [the] universal basic human right [to water] constitutes the
framework within [sic] the Claimants had to frame their expectations . . .
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expectation is legitimate in the first place; for instance, whether an unreliable
representation made by States in dire economic or political straits can create
material, investment-inducing reliance.
To trace how these unresolved debates about host States' regulatory
competence and contextual reasoning contribute to interpretive drift, it is
instructive to compare a series of recent awards from the ongoing Energy Charter
Treaty (ECT) disputes concerning regulatory measures by European
governments to wind down support for photovoltaic energy production.84 Before
the ripple effects of the 2007-2008 economic crisis had reached European shores,
the Spanish, Italian, and Czech governments had poured billions of euros into
their photovoltaic energy sectors. As the European fiscal crisis and the politics
of austerity took hold, Spain, which has borne the brunt of this saga thus far,
gradually dismantled its feed-in tariff scheme, and imposed grid duties and
power generation levies. The Italian and Czech governments followed suit.85
Foreign investors in the photovoltaic energy sectors of each country promptly
challenged these measures as violations of the FET obligation imposed by
Article 10(1) of the ECT.86
These disputes illustrate the play in the joints of the legitimate expectations
doctrine.8 7 At least four merits awards, each starting with the premise that
investors do not have a "right to regulatory stability," and that "[t]he state has a
right to regulate,"8 8 have arrived at different results. In Charanne v. Spain,89
Isolux v. Spain,90 and Blusun v. Italy91 (the first two in split decisions, the last
unanimously), tribunals found that there was no legitimate expectations
violation. The Eiser v. Spain92 tribunal, by contrast, unanimously held that the
investor's legitimate expectations had been frustrated.
The Charanne tribunal held that Article 10(1) ECT protected investors'
"legitimate expectation that, when modifying the existing regulation based on
which the investment was made, the State will not act unreasonably,
disproportionately or contrary to the public interest."93 Focusing on the
84. See generally Yulia S. Selivanova, Changes in Renewables Support Policy and Investment
Protection Under the Energy Charter Treaty, 33 ICSID REV. 433 (2018).
85. Id. at 435 n.6.
86. Id. at 435.
87. Ivaylo Dimitrov, Legitimate Expectations in the Absence of Specific Commitments
According to the Findings in Blusun v. Italy: Is There Inconsistency Among the Tribunals in the Solar
Energy Cases?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Aug. 18, 2017), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitratio
n.com/2017/08/18/legitimate-expectations-absence-specific-commitments-according-findings-blusun-v-
italy-inconsistency-among-tribunals-solar-energy-cases (describing these disputes as "the new Black
Swan in the investment arbitration world, reaching the importance and controversy of the Argentinian
crisis").
88. Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Award, ¶ 362
(May 4, 2017) [hereinafter Eiser Award]; see also Blusun S.A. v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/14/3, Award, ¶ 319 (Dec. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Blusun Award].
89. Charanne B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, Case No. V 062/2012, Final Award (SCC Jan. 21,
2016) [hereinafter Charanne Award].
90. Isolux Netherlands, B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, Case No. V2013/153, Final Award (SCC
July 17, 2016) [hereinafter Isolux Final Award].
91. Blusun Award, supra note 88.
92. Eiser Award, supra note 88.
93. Charanne Award, supra note 89, ¶ 514 (unofficial translation provided by Mena Chambers),
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foreseeability of regulatory changes, however, it determined that neither the
"specific rules" nor the "essential characteristics" of the photovoltaic energy
regime had been altered so as to violate Spain's FET obligations.94 The Isolux
tribunal also emphasized foreseeability in finding that investors' legitimate
expectations had not been frustrated.9 5 Emphasizing the due diligence
obligations attendant upon prudent investors, the tribunal observed that at the
time of the claimant's investment, the Supreme Court of Spain had upheld the
government's right to lawfully modify its regulatory framework,97 and that the
government had actually done so several times.98 Anticipating challenges on
whether the measures adopted were narrowly tailored to the policy objective, the
tribunal clarified that the requisite reasonability analysis did not require that the
adopted measures were the least restrictive ones.99
Guido Santiago Tawil's dissenting opinions in Charanne and Isolux
represent the other side of the legitimate expectations debate. Pointing to the
government's "regime of promotion and 'encouragement,"' his dissents insist
that "the creation of legitimate expectations for an investor is not solely limited
to the existence of a 'specific commitment' ... but can also originate or be based
on the legal order in force when the investment is made."00
The Eiser merits award, which did find a legitimate expectations violation,
seized upon this argument. The tribunal also held that notwithstanding the fiscal
burdens straining state subsidization of renewable energy, the obligation to
ensure FET remained unabated.10 1 Furthermore, reasoning from the ECT's
object and purpose as a treaty aimed at "creat[ing] stable, equitable . . . and
transparent conditions," it held that FET protects investors from a "fundamental"
changes to the regulatory framework.102 Although both Charanne and Eiser
augmented the specific undertaking requirement in the legitimate expectations
doctrine with protection against "fundamental" changes, neither tribunal was
clear about what the requisite degree of fundamentality looks like. Instead, the
Eiser tribunal lapsed into circularity, holding that "[w]hat is prohibited however
available at https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7162.pdf.
94. Id., ¶ 505-33.
95. Isolux Final Award, supra note 90, ¶ 818. One explanation for the overlapping reasoning
was the significant similarity in composition of the tribunals. The party-appointed arbitrators in both
Isolux and Charanne were
Guido Santiago Tawil (claimant's appointment) and Claus von Wobeser (respondent's appointment).
96. Isolux Final Award, supra note 90, ¶ 804; Damien Charlotin, In Now-Public Isolux v. Spain
Award, Measures that Later Breached Investor Protections in Eiser Case Were Not Deemed to Breach
Isolux's Legitimate Expectations, INV. ARB. REP. (June 29,2017), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/in-
now-public-isolux-v-spain-award-measures-that-later-breached-investor-protections-in-eiser-case-were-
not-deemed-to-breach-isoluxs-legitimate-expectations/.
97. Isolux Final Award, supra note 90, ¶¶ 793-95.
98. Id.T788.
99. Charlotin, supra note 96.
100. Charanne B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, Case No. 062/2012, Dissenting Opinion of Prof. Dr.
Guido Santiago Tawil, TT 5 (SCC Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7097_0.pdf (unofficial translation provide by McDermott Will & Emery Rechtsanwdlte
Steuerberater LLP). See also Isolux Netherlands, B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, Case No. V2013/153,
Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Guido Santiago Tawil, $T 6-7 (SCC July 6, 2016).
101. Eiser Award, supra note 88, 1371.
102. Id. IM 363, 374.
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is for a State to act unfairly, unreasonably or inequitably in the exercise of its
legislative power."1 0 3 A prohibition against unfair or inequitable regulatory
treatment in assessing FET breaches provides only an unhelpful tautology.
The only merits award to date concerning Italy's regulatory changes,
Blusun, found no legitimate expectations violation but held that regulatory
changes could not be "disproportionate to the aim of the legislative amendment,
and should have due regard to the reasonable reliance interests of [investors] who
may have committed substantial resources on the basis of the earlier regime."'04
In early 2015, amidst the Blusun dispute, the Italian government notified its
withdrawal from the ECT, citing budgetary costs.105
Italy's withdrawal from the ECT provides a hinge to the second half of this
Note, which focuses on a range of responses to the interpretive techniques
discussed in Part II. The focus thus far has been on how different interpretive
modalities have left the legitimate expectations doctrine unsettled. Indeed, recent
awards are rife with examples of the durability of the doctrine and lingering
ambiguities within it. 10 6 In tandem with, or perhaps as a result of, the elasticity
of the concept of legitimate expectations, claims by investors alleging the
frustration of legitimate expectations are increasingly being brought against
States with sterling rule of law traditions, straining the patience of some of the
most influential participants in the ISDS regime (including the United States).
The backlash against ISDS has thus been mainstreamed, and efforts towards
reform are now under way.
m. INCOMPLETE SOLUTIONS: BETWEEN USURPATION AND INEFFECTUALITY
This Part examines juridical and quasi-legislative responses to the
legitimate expectations doctrine that have been attempted to reduce the scope for
arbitral overreach. Juridical responses may be understood as a form of arbitral
self-discipline. Much as the concept of legitimate expectations was transplanted
from domestic public law, Section III.A documents countervailing moves by
arbitrators to draw upon public law standards of review that demarcate the host
State's room for maneuver in taking actions that might frustrate a foreign
investor's settled expectations. This self-corrective response has been
accompanied by a parallel development that is the subject of Section III.B: many
States have begun to redraft the architecture of ISDS to restrict textual elasticity
in investment treaties and, thus, the space afforded to arbitrators by treaty
interpretation rules. In describing the shortcomings of both approaches, this Part
103. Id. ¶ 387.
104. Blusun Award, supra note 88, ¶ 319(5).
105. Crina Baltag, What's New with the Energy Charter Treaty?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (June 13,
2015), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/06/13/whats-new-with-the-energy-charter-treat
y/.
106. Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/ 11/2,
Award, IM 546-75 (Apr. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Crystallex Award] (observing that legitimate expectations
are "now considered part of the FET standard" and "firmly rooted in arbitral practice"); Windstream
Energy LLC v. Government of Canada, Case No. 2013-22, Award, ¶¶ 347-82 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Sept. 27,
2016) (avoiding the language of the legitimate expectations doctrine but drawing heavily upon similar
arguments to find a breach of NAFTA Article 1105).
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seeks to constructively set the stage for the joint interpretations proposed in Part
IV.
A. Juridical Responses: The Possibility ofArbitral Self-Restraint?
The judicialization of international investment law brings both promise and
peril. Some believe that the law-making role of international adjudicators
constitutes "the primary mechanism for the progressive construction of
international law today."107 If the legitimate expectations doctrine is in need of a
course-correction, could it be led by arbitrators themselves? Illustratively,
tribunals have already reined in the doctrine's excesses in one respect by
clarifying that legitimate expectations must be objectively determinable and not
"solely the [investor's] subjective expectations."',0 8  Rather, legitimate
expectations must "be deduced from all the circumstances of the case, due regard
being paid to the host State's power to regulate its economic life in the public
interest."109
Although all international law obligations restrict sovereignty, what is
distinctive about ISDS is its hybrid nature. o10 For some, the operative question is
how to balance the rights of claimant-investors against the privileges,
immunities, and prerogatives of respondent-States.11 Such a balancing act raises
the question of how much deference the State should be afforded. This Section
is devoted to understanding the most important proposals for arbitral self-
discipline: public law standards of review, including reasonableness, margin of
appreciation, and proportionality.1 12 It concludes, however, that a course
correction through arbitral interventions alone is improbable.
1. Public Law Standards ofReview: Reasonableness, Margin of
Appreciation, and Proportionality
Reasonableness resembles rational basis review in U.S. constitutional law
and arbitrary and capricious review in U.S. administrative law. A measure is
reasonable if it bears a reasonable relationship to some rational objective.'
Reasonableness i highly congenial to host State discretion. With a handful of
107. See Alec Stone Sweet & Giacinto della Cananea, Proportionality, General Principles of
Law, and Investor-State Arbitration, 46 INT'L L. & POL. 911 (2014).
108. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, T 358
(Oct. 31, 2011) [hereinafter El Paso Award].
109. EDF Award, supra note 39, T 219.
110. See Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 74 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 151 (2003).
111. See, e.g., Walde Separate Opinion, supra note 44, 12.
112. A considerable volume of scholarship has advocated such trans-substantive borrowing from
public law. E.g., MONTr, supra note 24; STEPHAN SCHILL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (2010); STONE SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 31, at 171-217; Anthea Roberts,
The Next Battleground: Standards of Review in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in 16 INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CONGRESS SERIES 170 (2011).
113. See, e.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Award, ¶ 254 (Sept. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Continental Casualty Award]; Saluka Partial Award, supra note
20, T 460.
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exceptions,114 finding that a measure is reasonable does not preclude an FET
breach-that is, reasonableness i a necessary but not sufficient condition."5
The margin of appreciation standard, famously associated with the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)116 and now
found in numerous. areas of international law,' 17 is premised on the principle of
subsidiarity. It affords States "room for manoeuvre" in fulfilling their
obligations. However, investment tribunals seldom rely upon a margin of
appreciation; some have even disclaimed that their mandates preclude a "wide
margin of appreciation." 
9
The Strasbourg court has routinely found that governments are owed a
"wide" margin of appreciation without further specifying the width of the
margin.120 Similarly, within investment law, even tribunals that have recognized
the "high measure of deference that international law generally extends to the
right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders',121 very
rarely address how much deference is owed.122 Tribunals sometimes further
complicate matters by inflecting their margin of appreciation analysis with
context-specific considerations.123 Gesturing to a margin in general terms is
therefore neither outcome-determinative nor does it preclude the finding that the
investor's legitimate expectations have been violated.124
Scholars and arbitrators disagree about the appropriateness of a margin of
appreciation. Arguments about the analytical fit of the standard of review given
114. See, e.g., AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/22, Award, 1 7.6.9 (Sept. 23, 2010); Electrabel Decision, supra note 48, ¶M 8.34-.35; Genin
Award, supra note 79, ¶¶ 363-365; LG&E Decision, supra note 34, ¶¶ 245-258; Parkerings Award, supra
note 77, 1 332; Philip Morris Uruguay Award, supra note 59, IM 398-399; Frontier Petroleum Serv. Ltd.
v. Czech Republic, Final Award, ¶ 527 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 12, 2010); Saluka Partial Award, supra note
20, at IM 272-273.
115. See, e.g., Metalclad Award, supra note 34, IT 90-100; Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, ¶T 318-319 (Jan. 17, 2007); Lemire Decision, supra note 47, I 298-
309.
116. See, e.g., YUTAKA ARAi-TAKAIASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR (2002).
117. See Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907 (2006).
118. Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion Under the
European Convention on Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUROPE PUBLISHING, HUMAN RIGHTS FILE NO. 17,
at 5 (2000).
119. See, e.g., Renta 4 S.V.S.A. v. Russian Federation, Case No. 24/2007, Award, ¶¶ 18-22, 55,
125-126 (SCC July 20, 2012); Roslnvest Co. UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation, Case No. V079/2005, Final
Award, ¶ 567 (SCC Sept. 12, 2010).
120. See, e.g., Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1), 192 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11-14 (1991) (rejecting an investor's
legitimate expectations argument based on the Swedish government's "wide" margin of appreciation).
121. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award, 1263 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.
Nov. 13, 2000) [hereinafter S.D. Myers Partial Award]; see also Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United
Mexican States, Arbitral Award, ¶¶ 127 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 26, 2006) [hereinafter
Thunderbird Award].
122. Glamis Gold Award, supra note 47, 1617 (rejecting deference).
123. Continental Casualty Award, supra note 30, 1 181 (Argentina's economic state of
necessity); Philip Morris Uruguay Award, supra note 59, ¶¶ 398-399 (public health). See generally
Chemtura Corp. v. Goverrnent of Canada, Award, 1 123 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 2, 2010)
(describing margin of appreciation as "an assessment that must be conducted in concreto").
124. Crystallex Award, supra note 106, ¶¶ 546-575; S.D. Myers Partial Award, supra note 121,
¶T 263, 322.
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the tribunal's function in ISDS must be kept separate from arguments about the
outcomes of margin of appreciation reasoning. The political theory of deference
turns on the fact that governments have the knowledge, capacity, and legitimacy
to make laws and regulations, but arbitrators do not. William Burke-White and
Andreas von Staden have argued that both the hybrid role of the State in ISDS
and the legitimacy imperative justify the use of a margin of appreciation
standard.125 Others disagree, arguing that the conditions for invoking the margin
of appreciation in public law-jurisprudential consistency, formal precedents,
and consistent adjudicators-do not obtain in investment law. 126 Even if
tribunals could disambiguate the width of the margin of appreciation, there is a
case to be made against doing so: spelling out exactly how much regulatory
"space" the host State may lay claim to might induce moral hazard.127
Proportionality analysis is widely applied in constitutional courts,
administrative law tribunals, international dispute resolution bodies, and human
rights tribunals.128 Proportionality analysis, which is more an analytical method
than a standard of review, is done in three steps: (1) rational relatedness between
the means and the ends pursued by the government measure, (2) necessity,
understood as a least-restrictive means inquiry, and (3) proportionality stricto
sensu, balancing between benefits to the host State and harms to the investor.
Stone Sweet and his collaborators, among others, have championed ISDS as
"proportionality's next frontier." 129
In practice, however, tribunals often seem to invoke proportionality to
justify balancing between the host States' regulatory competence and investors'
expectations. 130 As with the margin of appreciation, proportionality stricto sensu
assessments of this kind do not establish limiting principles that constrain the
discretion of tribunals. Meanwhile, in overemphasizing this last step of the
125. William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Law Litigation in a Public Law
Sphere: The Standard ofReview in International Arbitration, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 283 (2010); see also
Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration's Engagement of the Public
Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 775 (2008).
126. Julian Arato, The Margin ofAppreciation in International Investment Law, 54 VA. J. INT'L
L. 545, 571 (2014) ("In this setting, the idea of a flexible margin of appreciation connotes little more than
a pseudo-standard. It does no analytical work beyond merely acknowledging that some degree of
deference is due. The structure of the regime makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a purposefully
variable standard to develop a rich and dynamic structure through case law.").
127. This effect is undercut by reputational effects: investors are often repeat players, and States,
in competing for foreign capital, have incentives not to avail themselves of the full regulatory space that
tribunals afford them.
128. See Mads Andenas & Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality: WTO Law in Comparative
Perspective, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 371 (2007).
129. Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality's New Frontier, 4 L. ETHICS
HUM. RTS. 47 (2010). But see Jose Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense, in
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 331 (2011) (criticizing the proportionality
standard).
130. See, e.g., Blusun Award, supra note 88, ¶ 319(5) (employing a "proportionality" test
balancing "the aim of the legislative amendment [to Italy's photovoltaic tariffs]" and "the reasonable
reliance interests of recipients who may have committed substantial resources on the basis of the earlier
regime"); Saluka Partial Award, supra note 20, at ¶ 304 (requiring that "expectations, in order for them
to be protected, must rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness in light ofthe circumstances"); see
also Lemire Decision, supra note 47, TT 285, 500; EDF Award, supra note 39, TT 286, 301; Continental
Casualty Award, supra note 113; Parkerings Award, supra note 77, ¶ 368; Teemed Award, supra note 36,
¶ 122.
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proportionality analysis, such balancing tests disguise the operation of the more
restrictive step in the proportionality triad: necessity, which, as applied,
resembles strict scrutiny. Tribunals typically employ a least restrictive means
(LRM) test, looking to whether the investor's rights are restricted only to the
extent necessary for the government to accomplish its policy objectives. Some
tribunals take a deferential approach to LRM analysis, acknowledging their
limits as a substitute for the regulatory sophistication of the government.1
Others are significantly less deferential, finding regulatory measures to be FET
violations if alternative measures are available.132 LRM analysis has rightly been
criticized because it authorizes adjudicators to undertake a searching review of
policy alternatives available to governments.
2. Whither Public Law Standards ofReview?
The standards of review described above are each undermined by the very
indeterminacy that they seek to cure. In choosing a standard of review, a tribunal
may not actually select the level of deference to be accorded to the State's
regulatory function; instead, it may simply offer an analytical gloss disguising a
judgment that reconciles sovereignty and international obligations.13 3
Channeling the work of interpretation into standards of review that might not
meaningfully constrain tribunal decision-making might counterproductively
legitimize the very discretion that juridical responses set out to cure.
The prospects for a juridical fix are further cast into doubt by the
decentralized, ad hoc nature of ISDS and disagreements about the role of stare
decisis or jurisprudence constante.134 A number of tribunals have championed
relying on precedent "as a matter of comparison and . . . of inspiration,"35 as
well as the development of law through system-conscious approaches.' 3 6 After
all, "tribunals implement broadly phrased international standards set out in very
similar terms" and define "standards of good governance and of the rule of
law."' 37 Andrea Bjorklund describes how "the entire arbitral community ... will
131. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Award on Merits of Phase 2, ¶J 123,
128, 155 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Apr. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Pope & Talbot Phase 2 Award].
132. See, e.g., S.D. Myers Partial Award, supra note 121, ¶ 266.
133. The ECtHR sometimes blurs margin of appreciation-type reasoning into its proportionality
analysis. See ARAi-TAKAHASHi, supra note 116, at 193; Marc-Andr6 Eissen, The Principle of
Proportionality in the Case-Law ofthe European Court ofHuman Rights, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 125, 127-31 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
134. Marc Jacob, Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication, 12 GERMAN L.J.
1005 (2011).
135. AES Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction,
TT 30-32 (Apr. 26, 2005).
136. Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on
the Application for Partial Annulment of Continental Casualty Company and the Application for Partial
Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ¶ 84 (Sept. 16, 2011); Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 293 (Aug. 4, 2011); Duke
Energy Award, supra note 47, ¶ 117; Noble Energy, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 50 (Mar. 5, 2008); Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of
Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendations onProvisional
Measures, 1 67 (Mar. 21, 2007).
137. Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and
Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law, in 50 YEARS OF THE
336 [Vol. 44: 2
Still the Law ofNations
help to establish a hierarchy of cases, and the scope and meaning of the law
itself.""'
Others believe tribunals should hew to case-specific approaches and aim to
ensure the award's recognition, enforcement, and legitimacy.1 39 In his 2012
Freshfields Lecture, Reisman argued that uneasy compromises uch as "a
modicum of awareness of the system as a whole" or "greater contextual
awareness" are so indeterminate as to defeat the ability of participants to "agree
on their existence and operation."l40 Such indeterminacy has critical
implications: it means that a juridical fix might not "stick." Disputes in ISDS
will always be case-specific to some degree, and tribunals could choose to
exercise largely untrammeled discretion even in areas where jurisprudence
appears to have crystallized.
The haphazard, undisciplined way in which arbitral jurisprudence develops
exacerbates another problem. Douglas points out that "[t]he submissions of
counsel often stop short of providinp any real analysis of the context for the
truncated quotations from awards."14 Tribunals may thus inadvertently initiate
jurisprudential developments that abstract away from their context-specific
origins.
Whether more robust adherence to precedent will regularize interpretive
practices in ISDS remains to be seen. The precedential authority of the Salini test
for defining protected investments and, closer to home, the outsized prominence
the Tecmed standard in early legitimate expectations doctrine, are promising in
this regard. The recent push for transparency in ISDS might also help pave the
way for increased attentiveness to other tribunals' reasoning. For the time being,
however, standards of review are not poised to provide dependable, durable
course-corrections in arbitral jurisprudence, putting the possibility of this
juridical fix to bed.
B. Quasi-Legislative Responses: Backlash and Investment Treaty
Reform
Although international law lacks legislators as such, States have long relied
on quasi-legislative interventions uch as treaty renegotiations to manage their
delegation of authority to arbitral tribunals.142 What is special about the present
reform moment is the volume and variety of changes taking place.143 The reform
NEW YORK CONVENTION 5, 44 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2009).
138. Andrea Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante, in
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 265, 266 (Colin Picker et
al. eds., 2008).
139. See, e.g., Hochtief AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/31, Decision on
Jurisdiction, T 58 (Oct. 24,2011); Romak S.A. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, Case No. AA280, Award, ¶ 171
(Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 26, 2009).
140. W. Michael Reisman, 'Case Specific Mandates' Versus 'Systemic Implications': How
Should Investment Tribunals Decide?: The Freshfields Arbitration Lecture, 29 ARB. INT'L 131, 150
(2014) (discussing Azurix, AES, and Methanex).
141. Douglas, supra note 46, at 28.
142. See Yannaca-Small, supra note 30, at 386-87.
143. See UNCTAD 2017 Report, supra note 6; see also UNCTAD, INVESTMENT POLICY
FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2015), https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary
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moment is an expression of the will of States to preserve their authority in an
investment regime that was designed in their names.144 Although the legitimate
expectations doctrine is merely one pathology, responses to it provide a typology
for reform efforts more generally.
1. "Exit, " or the Revocation of Treaty Obligations
Some States have not taken kindly to finding themselves on the proverbial
stand. At the extremes, States have backed away from their ISDS commitments
altogether. Outright "exit" has taken several forms: terminations or withdrawals
from investment agreements,145 denouncements of the ICSID Convention,146 and
policies of excluding ISDS clauses in newly-negotiated trade and investment
treaties.147 A less dramatic half-step towards exit is to eliminate FET clauses
without replacing them with close substitutes.148
/diaepcb20l5d5_en.pdf
144. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Why Are We "Re-Calibrating" Our Investment Treaties?, 4 WORLD
ARB. & MEDIATION REv. 143 (2010); Suzanne A. Spears, The QuestforPolicy Space in aNew Generation
ofInternational Investment Agreements, 13 J. INT'L ECON.L. 1037 (2010).
145. Consider, for example, treaty terminations by Ecuador, Venezuela, South Africa, Czech
Republic, India, Indonesia, Italy, and Argentina. See Malcolm Langford, Daniel Behn & Ole Kristian
Fauchald, Backlash and State Strategies in International Investment Law, in THE CHANGING PRACTICES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (Tanja Aalberts & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen eds., 2018); see also loana
Knoll-Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard and Human Rights Norms, in HUMAN RIGHTS
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 310, 317 n.23 (P.M. Dupuy et al. eds., 2009)
(suggesting that states are considering BIT terminations "as a consequence of the different arbitral
proceedings they have been involved in"). Merely facing investment claims, rather than adverse awards,
might suffice; consider the example above of Italy's withdrawal from the ECT. Gaetano lorio Fiorelli,
Italy Withdraws from Energy Charter Treaty, GLOBAL ARB. NEWS (May 6, 2015), https://globalarbitr
ationnews.com/italy-withdraws-from-energy-charter-treaty-20150507.
146. See, e.g., UNCTAD, Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact on Investor-
State Claims, IIA Issues Note No. 2, 1 n.2 (Dec. 2010) (describing Bolivia and Ecuador's denunciations).
Bolivia withdrew on May 2, 2007, submitting notice pursuant to ICSID Convention, article 71. President
Evo Morales pointed to "legal, media and diplomatic pressure of some multinationals that ... resist the
sovereign rulings of countries, making threats and initiating suits in international arbitration." See Latin
Leftists Mull Quitting World Bank Arbitrator, REUTERS, Apr. 29, 2007, https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-bolivia-venezuela-nationalizationslatin-leftists-mull-quitting-world-bank-arbitrator-
idUSN2936448520070430?feedType=RSS. Ecuador withdrew by parliamentary vote on Jun. 12, 2009.
147. Brazil's investment agreements since 2015 have not contained ISDS provisions. Australia
also pursued this approach briefly but has reverted to including ISDS provisions. Intra-MERCOSUR
Protocol for the Cooperation and the Facilitation of Investment, Apr. 7, 2017, https://investment
policy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5548/download.
148. Brazil and Singapore, among a growing list of countries, have concluded agreements
without FET clauses or close substitutes. This approach appears particularly common in IIAs between
developing countries or IlAs involving the European Union as a party. See, e.g., Agreement Between the
Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Government Kingdom of Morocco on the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Rwanda-Morocco, Oct. 19, 2016, https://investmentpolicy.
unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5417/download; Brazil-Peru Economic and
Trade Expansion Agreement, Braz.-Peru, Apr. 29, 2016; Cooperation and Investment Facilitation
Agreement between the Federative Republic of Brazil and Republic of Chile, Braz.-Chile, Nov. 24,2015;
Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the
Republic of Colombia, Braz.-Colom., Oct. 9, 2015; Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement
between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Angola, Braz.-Angl., Apr. 1, 2015;
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the Republic of India and the Republic of
Singapore, India-Sing., June 29, 2005, https://ie.enterprisesg.gov.sg/
-/media/IE%20Singapore/Files/FTA/Existing%20FTA/CECA%20India/Legal%2OText/CECALegal
Text.pdf; Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Sing.-Austl., Feb. 17, 2003, 2257 U.N.T.S. 103;
Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership, N.Z.-Sing., Nov. 14,
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Exit remains a marginal possibility: withdrawals from ISDS are rare, and
the reasons why some States have pursued this path are not easily generalizable.
Moreover, several States that have considered exiting the ISDS regime have thus
far remained within it,149 often while renegotiating their commitment to the
regime in measured ways. What is more useful to describe, then, are ways in
which States are responding through "voice" rather than through "exit," 150 which
allows them to continue benefitting from participation in the regime while
asserting their primacy anew.
2. "Treatifying" the Right to Regulate
Efforts to "treatify" the right to regulate locate part of the blame for
interpretive drift in the treaty provisions that arbitrators must interpret and apply.
Investment treaties provide the applicable law in disputes between investors and
States. Because the host State's rights are rarely made explicit, tribunals are left
to adduce the scope of those rights anew in each dispute. The resulting
interpretive dispersal has drawn the ire of States and their citizens, who may react
with hostility towards the ISDS regime when regulation in the public interest
comes under arbitral scrutiny.
In light of increasing public discontentment with ISDS,152 States have
begun to pay attention to treaty language and how it can be used to alter the
substantive balance of rights between investors and themselves. In contrast to
the template-like provisions that were commonplace in the early history of ISDS,
States have (1) reduced the discretion available to arbitrators through alternative
treatment standards; (2) increased precision and interpretive guidelines, such as
language explicitly constraining which expectations might be deemed
"legitimate;" (3) included "right to regulate" and general exceptions clauses; and
(4) included hierarchically-ordered goals in treaty preambles.1
To avoid mischaracterizing as reform what might merely be an explosion
in the number and complexity of investment treaties and disputes, there must be
evidence of discontentment with the status quo and directionality in treaty-
making practices (for example, a concern with reining in interpretive
2000, 2203 U.N.T.S 129.
149. See, e.g., Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Denunciation of the ICSID
Convention, 237 N.Y. L.J. 122 (June 26, 2007) (commenting upon Nicaragua and Cuba's proclamation
of their intention to withdraw).
150. See ALBERT O. HtRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
151. loana Knoll-Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard and Human Rights Norms,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION, supra note 145, at 317.
152. See, for example, the public outcry in reaction to the Vattenfall arbitration and both Philip
Morris disputes.
153. Stone Sweet and Grisel note that BITs increasingly contain interpretive guidelines but that
the rate of growth of new investment treaties containing interpretive guidelines on indirect expropriation
is much slower than the rate of growth of new investment treaties altogether. STONE SWEET & GRISEL,
supra note 31, at 212.
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dispersionl54 or a nexus to unsatisfactorily reasoned awards155). Recent
reforms-and public justifications offered for them-reflect a reversion towards
statism in ISDS. ISDS reforms capture a collective response by States against
arbitral jurisprudence enabled by old-generation treaties that did not pin down
the shared intent of States parties. The reform moment, then, is ISDS's coming
of age.
a. Alternative Treatment Standards
One response to the indeterminacy of FET provisions is to shift the weight
to another treatment standard. Evolving treaty practice has followed two
approaches in doing so. The first is to link the FET explicitly to another treatment
standard such as the customary international minimum standard of treatment.15 6
The second kind of substitution replaces the FET with an alternative treatment
provision.5 7 Justifying the latter kind of substitution in India's 2015 Model BIT,
the Indian Law Commission cited extensively to scholarly criticism-backed by
examples from early legitimate expectations doctrine-of the FET as "wide,
tenuous and imprecise." It concluded, "The absence of the FET provision will
safeguard India's right to regulate by minimising the possibilities of unexpected
restrictions on its regulatory power that broad interpretations of an undefined
FET may bring."'59 India's BIT reform was thus attentive to the distribution of
interpretive authority between States parties and arbitral tribunals.
b. Increased Precision
Many FET provisions have been made more precise through (1)
154. See generally Franck, supra note 19. Attentiveness to reasoning appears to increase when
tribunals are inconsistent regarding similar treaty provisions and similar facts: the diametrically opposed
decisions in Lauder v. Czech Republic and CME v. Czech Republic present a good case study of
inconsistency and the crisis of legitimacy that follows. William Burke-White, The Argentine Financial
Crisis: State Liability under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION, supra note 14, at 425-26.
155. Consider, for example, the hostile reaction of the Argentine legislature to the CMS Gas
Annulment Committee's obiter dicta regarding legally flawed reasoning in the CMS Gas award. See
William Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability under BITs and the Legitimacy of
the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH LAW & POLICY 199, 227-28 (2008).
156. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 5; Investment Agreement for
the COMESA Common Investment Area, art. 14(3), May 23, 2007 [hereinafter CCIA]; Dominican
Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement art. 10.5, Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat. 462
(2005) [hereinafter DR-CAFTA]; Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 9.6, Feb. 4, 2016 [hereinafter TPP],
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text; Model
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can., art. 5, 2004 [hereinafter 2004 Canadian
Model FIPA].
157. See, e.g., 2015 India Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 3.1; South African Development
Community (SADC) Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 5 option 2, Aug. 2012,
https://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf (providing for a
"fair administrative treatment" standard).
158. LAW COMM'N OF INDIA, REPORT NO. 260: ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT MODEL INDIAN
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY 15, n.30 (2015), http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports
/Report260.pdf. The report decries the inconsistency of tribunals in determining "what constitutes
legitimate expectations of investors under FET." Id. at 15 (citing to CMS Gas and LG&E and comparing
them against Total v. Argentina and El Paso v. Argentina).
159. Id. at 16.
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definitional provisions that carefully restrict the scope of the FET obligation'60
or (2) closed lists that enumerate "the rights that are within the scope of the fair
and equitable treatment obligation."161 Both kinds of precision represent a
marked departure from old-generation investment treaties, which, for the most
part, merely implore States to provide FET without further qualification.16 2
These moves also serve a number of goals, including enclosure, norm
compliance, foreseeability, and reduction of the discretion of arbitral tribunals.
A special case of using textual precision to correct for open-endedness are
provisions that disambiguate what expectations are "legitimate" enough.'63
Treaties are increasingly clarifying that government actions or omissions that
frustrate investors' expectations do not automatically constitute treaty violations.
164 These treaties prescribe proportionality-type assessments or require a
showing of investment-inducing representations that investors can be shown to
have reasonably relied upon.166
The temptations of precision must be tempered by a note of caution.
Calling a treaty provision more precise is an evaluative act, not an inert
description-it is an insistence that from an investor's perspective, a precise
provision does what it purports to do. Revisions to ensure "linguistic precision"
are "easier said than done,"l6 7 particularly because the provisions at issue
continue to use evaluative qualifiers (such as "manifestly arbitrary," "excessive,"
or "necessary").168
160. See, e.g., ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement art. 11, Feb. 26, 2009, ASEAN
Legal Instruments No. 30 [hereinafter ACIA]; see also Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement art. 11.5,
S. Kor.-Aus., Apr. 8, 2014, ATS 43.
161. Andrew Mitchell et al., Good Governance Obligations in International Economic Law: A
Comparative Analysis of Trade andInvestment, 17 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 7, 19 (2016); Model Text for
the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 3.1 (2016). See also Free Trade Agreement Between the
European Union and Singapore, E.U.-Sing., art. 9.4(2), Apr. 18, 2018 [hereinafter EU-Singapore FTA],
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=96 1.
162. See, e.g., 2008 German Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 2.2; 2006 French Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 3; 2004 Dutch Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 3.
163. See, e.g., TPP arts. 9.6.4-9.6.5.
164. See, e.g., TTIP art. 2(2); Investment Agreement Between the Government of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of
Chile, H.K.-Chile, Nov. 18, 2016, https://www.tid.gov.hk/english/trade-relations/hkclfta/text
agreement.html; Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Oct. 30, 2016
[hereinafter CETA], http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/; Agreement
to Amend the Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 13, 2016, https://dfat.gov.au/trade
/agreements/in-force/safta/Documents/agreement-to-amend-the-singapore-australia-free-trade-agreem
ent.pdf. See generally UNCTAD 2017 Report, supra note 6, at 120-21.
165. 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Annex B, T 4(a) (requiring a "case-by-case,
fact-based inquiry that considers . . . (ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct,
reasonable investment-backed expectations [and] (iii) the character of the government action."); see also
2004 Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 156, Annex B.13(l).
166. CETA art. 8.10(4), supra note 164; EU-Singapore FTA art 9.4(2), n. 155; TPP, Annex 9-B,
art. 3(a)(ii), n.36.
167. Reisman, supra note 49, at 5.
168. CAROLINE HENCKELS, PROPORTIONALITY AND DEFERENCE IN INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION: BALANCING INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND REGULATORY AUTONOMY 30 (2016).
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c. Right to Regulate and General Exceptions Clauses
A right to regulate clause textually asserts the State's regulatory
competence and clarifies that its obligations under the treaty should not be taken
to limit that competence.169 Right to regulate clauses often specifically mark out
regulation for particular purposes such as public health, labor rights, or
environmental protection.170 Their inclusion in new-generation treaties signifies
not only a reassertion of statism but also the reconfiguration of investment
treaties to better accommodate regulation in the public interest.
General exceptions provisions, often modeled after the GATT's general
exceptions clause, are circumscribed exceptions to obligations imposed by other
parts of the investment treaty upon the host State.'7' General exceptions clauses
are also becoming increasingly prevalent in investment treaties.172 Presumably
in response to the Philip Morris disputes, recent investment treaties have begun
including carve-outs for tobacco regulation.17 3
Although general exceptions provisions provide a clearer textual hook than
an ambiguous right to regulate, they may prove counterproductive if they are
narrowly interpreted, creating the "unintended consequence of limiting the range
of legitimate objectives available to the state (expression unius est exclusion
alterius)," which might result in a "limitation, rather than a widening, of policy
space," further constraining the government's ability to regulate.174 If investment
tribunals are already authorized "to balance investor interests with an unlimited
list of legitimate government concerns-a list far broader than the exceptions in
GATT Article XX,"' 7 5 this would represent a needless restriction of the
government's ability to regulate in the public interest.
169. See, e.g., TPP art. 9.16; Agreement Amending Annex 1 (Co-Operation on Investment) of
The Protocol on Finance and Investment of the South African Development Community art. 12, Aug. 30,
2016, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5527/downlo
ad.
170. See, e.g., CETA, supra note 164, Annex 8-A(3); 2015 Norway Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty art. 12; United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement art. 10.12, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text.
171. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of Malaysia
for an Economic Partnership art. 10, December 13, 2005, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/malaysialepa/index.html; Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the Republic
of India And the Republic of Singapore art. 6.11, India-Sing., June 29, 2005,
https://ie.enterprisesg.gov.sg/-/media/IE%20Singapore/Files/FTA/Existing%20FTA/CECA%20India/L
egal%20Text/CECA LegalText.pdf; 2004 Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 156, art. 10; Bilateral
Investment Treaty Between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Govemment
of the Republic of Singapore, Jordan-Sing., art. 18, May 16, 2004, https://investmentpolicy.
unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/1755/download; Agreement Between Japan
and the Republic of Singapore for a New-Age Economic Partnership, Jap.-Sing., art. 83, January 13, 2002,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/singapore/jsepa-1.pdf; CCIA art. 22, supra note 156.
172. See HENCKELS, supra note 168, at 81; Spears, supra note 144, at 1043-44.
173. See, e.g., TPP art. 29.5; 2016 Singapore-Australia FTA art. 22; see also Sergio Puig &
Gregory Shaffer, A Breakthrough with the TPP: The Tobacco Carve-Out, 16 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L.
& ETHICS 327 (2016).
174. Andrew Newcombe, The Use of General Exceptions in IAs: Increasing Legitimacy or
Uncertainty?, in IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 267, 279 (Armand de Mestral
& C61ine IUvesque eds., 2013).
175. Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment
Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 83 (2008).
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d Rewriting Treaty Preambles
According to the general rule of treaty interpretation in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a treaty's preamble forms part of
the "context" for the "ordinary meaning to be given to [its] terms."1 76
Unfortunately, as written, investment treaty preambles open the door to over-
expansive interpretations.1 77
Many preambles take a kitchen-sink approach, listing numerous potentially
conflicting State interests without any kind of ordering. For example, the
preamble to the United States-Ecuador BIT illustratively lists goals "includ[ing]
economic cooperation, increased flow of capital, a stable framework for
investment, development of respect for internationally-recognized worker rights,
and maximum efficiency in the use of economic resources."7  Under several
theories of labor economics, respect for internationally-recognized worker rights
might potentially restrict he goal of maximum efficiency in the use of economic
resources. The preamble offers no guidance for resolving such conflicts.
The hollowness of this approach is clear from preambles in older treaties
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The NAFTA
preamble lists as many possible goals as a trade treaty could possibly have,
including commitments to "promote sustainable development" and to "preserve
their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare."l79 Yet, twenty-three years later,
these commitments appear to have imposed no perceptible constraint upon the
judgments of NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals. Rather than externally constraining
tribunals, kitchen-sink preambles instead offer tribunals a repository of potential
justifications for decisions that likely could have been made in the same way
absent such preambles. Inadvertently or otherwise, such provisions smuggle in a
source of textual legitimacy for exercises of arbitral discretion.
Although a small number of States have begun to include goals such as
sustainable development in their investment treaty preambles,s or resisted the
pull of kitchen-sink preambles by prioritizing the protection of the public interest
as the outer limits to the pursuit of economic ends,1st it remains to be seen
176. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(2), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
177. See, e.g., MTD Annulment, supra note 39, ¶ 113 (holding that preambular language about
"creat[ing] favorable conditions for investments" should not be restricted to "prescriptions for passive
behavior of the State or avoidance of prejudicial conduct to the investors 'but as a "proactive statement"
meant to be "conducive to fostering the promotion of foreign investment").
178. See, e.g., Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment pmbl., U.S.-Ecuador, Aug. 27,
1993, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43558.pdf [hereinafter 1993 US-Ecuador BIT].
Ecuador submitted a notice terminating the US-Ecuador BIT after its Constitutional Court declared the
ISDS provisions of the BIT to be inconsistent with the Ecuadorean Constitution in 2010. Notice of
Termination of United States-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, 83 Fed. Reg. 23327 (May 18, 2018).
179. North American Free Trade Agreement pmbl., Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
180. See 2004 Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 156, pmbl.; CCIA, supra note 156, pmbl.
181. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Rwanda, pmbl., Feb. 19, 2008, S. TREATY Doc. No. 110-23 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 US-Rwanda BIT]
(proclaiming a desire to create a "stable framework for investment ... in a manner consistent with the
protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of internationally recognized labor
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whether hierarchically-ordered' State priorities in treaty preambles will
meaningfully constrain arbitral decision-making. Meanwhile, many preambles
set out an objective of establishing and maintaining a "stable framework for
investment," which runs the risk of being understood as a codification of the
expansive conception of legitimate expectations (i.e., guaranteeing the stability
of laws and regulations).'82
Taken together, the juridical and quasi-legislative responses to arbitral
innovations, such as the legitimate expectations doctrine, have been mired
between usurpation of State authority and ineffectiveness. The putatively self-
corrective effort by arbitrators to rein in interpretive drift has been
counterproductive. It has imposed no perceptible constraints upon arbitral
discretion, while affording tribunals the appearance of being guided by
methodical application of public law standards of review. Meanwhile, quasi-
legislative reforms by States terminating old-generation investment agreements
and renegotiating or signing treaties with innovative provisions represent an
incomplete sovereigntist response at best, and an ineffectual one at worst.
"Treatifying" the right to regulate is a halfway house in the recentralization of
State authority in international investment law. It allows States an additional pass
at shaping the terms of their self-constraint without reserving the authority to
dynamically interpret their treaty obligations over time.
IV. A SOVEREIGNTIST Fix: JOINT INTERPRETATIONS AS INTERNATIONAL
LAWMAKING
A. Legal Framework: ISDS as Contingent Delegation
If tribunals cannot be depended upon to restrain their own interpretations,
States may seek to reclaim their primacy by rethinking their delegation of
decisional authority to arbitral tribunals. After all, delegation of interpretive
authority to arbitral tribunals is contingent and restricted in scope, rather than
permanent and general. Scrutiny of this delegation has intensified into an
opportunity for reform. Exit by some States has cast a shadow upon the future
of ISDS, but States are not consigned to submitting themselves wholly to the
interpretive vicissitudes of arbitral tribunals or to walking away from foreign
investment by exiting the ISDS system. Instead, as the architects of ISDS, States
can recapture law-making and interpretive authority over their investment
treaties. Describing this reclamation as backlash against the ISDS regime
unhelpfully focuses attention on the spur for change rather than on the reforms
themselves.
The sharing of interpretive authority between tribunals and States through
joint interpretations between States parties is a tried-and-tested, but still seldom
rights").
182. See, e.g., 1993 US-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 178, pmbl.
183. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2015:
Reforming International Investment Governance, 124-25, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2015 (June 25,
2015).
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used,184 way for States to rein in interpretive dispersal. The general law of treaty
interpretation requires that "subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions" and
"subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation" be "taken into account."185
Bruno Simma has championed such subsequent agreements and practice,
arguing that "if there exists-and this is a matter of fact-subsequent practice or
a subsequent agreement, there is, lege artis, simply no way to get around it. This
is it, because the intention of the parties to the treaty Will always prevail."l 8 6
Joint interpretations must be distinguished from subsequent agreements,
which treaty interpreters must "take into account" under Article 31(3) of VCLT.
Joint interpretations put investors on notice that States may collectively adopt
binding joint interpretations, leading to optimal decision-making and risk-
pricing by foreign investors while maintaining the continuing interpretive
authority of States parties. They strengthen permissive provisions in the
VCLT-allowing treaty interpreters to look to subsequent agreements-into
mandatory State-imposed constraints upon arbitral tribunals. Drawing upon the
success of joint interpretations in clarifying the scope of the FET obligation
under NAFTA and other examples, this Note concludes that this approach
promises the most potent check upon legitimate expectations doctrine.
The foreseeable problem with States taking back the reins is that it dilutes
the credible commitment that they make to investors by signing investment
agreements. The time-inconsistency problem arises when, after making
investment-inducing commitments, States are subsequently tempted to walk
back their commitments to investors who are locked in. The appropriate role of
"voice" for States that wish to maintain credible commitments to investors is to
only exercise their "voice" to clarify rather than to change the investment treaty
obligations. As Todd Weiler points out, "it is the treaty that is the subject of
interpretation, not the ongoing volition of the parties thereto."'8 7
B. Joint Interpretations in Practice
Joint interpretations return States to a place of primacy in treaty
interpretation by enabling a response to tribunals that misconstrue the shared
intent of States parties. They also facilitate a learning effect in international
investment law, in which treaty counterparties may agree to respond
184. See Roberts, supra note 13, at 216-17; UNCTAD, Interpretation ofIL4s: What States Can
Do, IIA ISSUE NOTE 3 (2011).
185. VCLT, supra note 176, art. 31(3).
186. Bruno Simma, Miscellaneous Thoughts on Subsequent Agreement and Practice, in
TREATIES AND SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 46 (Georg Nolte ed., 2013). See also Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots.
v. Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045, $ 49 (Dec. 13) ("'[A]n agreement as to the interpretation of
a provision reached after the conclusion of the treaty represents an authentic interpretation by the parties
which must be read into the treaty."') (quoting Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Eighteenth
Session, 221, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L. 116, reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 172, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add. 1).
187. TODD WEILER, THE INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EQUALITY,
DISCRIMINATION AND MINIMUM STANDARDS OF TREATMENT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 32 (2013).
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preemptively to forestall undesirable interpretations of similar clauses in other
treaties. For example, after Maffezini and Siemens, two cases in which the most-
favored nation (MFN) treatment obligation was read expansively to afford
investors access to ISDS provisions found in other investment agreements, a
number of States leapt to action.88 Panama and Argentina, for instance,
established an "interpretive declaration" through diplomatic notes and
interpreted the MEN clause in the BIT between them not to include dispute
resolution clauses.!89
The canonical example of a joint interpretation in international investment
law remains the NAFTA Free Trade Commission's (FTC) Interpretive Note of
2001, which sought to disambiguate the FET clause inNAFTA's Article 1105.190
In the first Chapter 11 dispute to reach the merits phase, the tribunal held that
"[t]he only conceivable relevant substantive principle of Article 1105 is that a
NAFTA investor should not be dealt with in a manner that contravenes
international law."l 9' The S.D. Myers tribunal concurred that a breach of
Article 1105 required treatment "in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that the
treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the international
perspective."'92 It held that such a determination "must be made in the light of
the high measure of deference that international law generally extends to the
right of domestic authorities to regulate matters within their own borders."'
93
Notwithstanding this asserted deference, a majority of the S.D. Myers tribunal
concluded without further explanation that "breach of Article 1102," NAFTA's
national treatment provision, "essentially establishes a breach of Article 1105 as
well."194 In Pope & Talbot, the tribunal likened Article 1105 to FET clauses in
BITs and concluded that the FET obligation was additive to the IMS.195 Going
further still, the Metalclad tribunal found that Mexico breached Article 1105 by
failing to provide a "transparent and predictable framework."'96 These holdings
illustrate how attempted judicial (interpretive) resolution of the scope of
NAFTA's Article 1105 by the Azinian v. United Mexican States and S.D. Myers
tribunals was unsuccessful and led to interpretive dispersion rather than
correcting for it. A quasi-legislative fix, such as a formal renegotiation of
NAFTA, would have required the States parties to muster considerable political
188. Simma, supra note 186, at 46. See also Draft of the Central America-Dominican Republic-
United States Free Trade Agreement art. 10.4, n.1, Jan. 28, 2004,
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/USACAFTA/Jan28draft/ChaplOe.pdf (clarifying that the
"understanding and intent that [DR-CAFTA's MFN] clause. . . could not reasonably lead to a conclusion
similar to that of the Maffezini case").
189. See Daimler Fin. Serys. AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1, Award,
¶ 272 (Aug. 22, 2012).
190. North American Free Trade Agreement Comm'n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain
Chapter Eleven Provisions (July 31, 2001) [hereinafter NAFTA Free Trade Commission],
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH1 lunderstanding e.asp
191. Azinian v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, Award, ¶ 92 (Nov. 1,
1999).
192. S.D. Myers Partial Award, supra note 121, ¶ 263.
193. Id.
194. Id. ¶ 266.
195. Pope & Talbot Phase 2 Award, supra note 131, ¶ 110.
196. Metalclad Award, supra note 34, T 100.
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capital and would have threatened disruptions to other parts of the carefully
negotiated instrument.
The FTC therefore turned to binding joint interpretations to fill this lacuna
andresolve the doctrinal ambiguity surrounding the FET provision in NAFTA.
The FTC acted pursuant to authority conferred upon it by NAFTA's Article
1131(2), which authorized it to issue interpretations that "shall be binding" upon
tribunals in Chapter 11 investment disputes. The relevant part of the FTC's
Interpretive Note simply read:
Article 1105 (1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to
investments of investors of another Party.. .. The concepts of "fair and equitable
treatment" and "full protection and security" do not require treatment in addition to
or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens.1
9 7
Although it is questionable in light of the holdings that prompted the
Interpretive Note whether arbitrators on NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals uniformly
agreed with the FTC's interpretation of Article 1105, most tribunals quickly
accepted it as binding.198 Some tribunals relied upon Article 31(3)(a) of the
VCLT and customary international law establishing the importance of
subsequent agreements for treaty interpretation.'99 However, as explained further
below, subsequent agreements do not have binding legal force. While the rules
of treaty interpretation require that tribunals consider subsequent agreements,
tribunals with anti-sovereigntist inclinations may subsequently choose to
disregard the State's attempt at clarifying the intended meaning of disputed
investment treaty provisions. More importantly, NAFTA itself made joint
interpretations by the FTC binding. As the Methanex tribunal explained:
The purport of Article 1131(2) is clear beyond peradventure . . . . Even assuming
that the FTC interpretation was a far-reaching substantive change .. . Methanex cites
no authority for its argument that far-reaching changes in a treaty must be
accomplished only by formal amendment rather than by some form of agreement
between all of the parties.200
Seeking to preempt controversy over whether the FTC Interpretive Note
was an amendment rather an interpretation, the Methanex tribunal noted that,
under international law, treaties can "provide for their amendment by agreement
without requiring a re-ratification." 201 Nevertheless, the Pope & Talbot tribunal
regarded the FTC Interpretive Note as an unlawful treaty amendment not in
conformance with the requirements for treaty amendment, and stuck to the idea
that FET is a self-standing right that is additive upon IMS, dismissing the
197. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, supra note 190.
198. See, e.g., Grand River Award, supra note 47, ¶ 175; Glamis Gold Award, supra note 47,
¶ 599; Methanex Final Award, supra note 80, pt. IV, ch. D, ¶ 20; ADF Award, supra note 20, 1 177;
Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, ¶ 121 (Oct. 11, 2002)
[hereinafter Mondev Award] .
199. See, e.g., Methanex Final Award, supra note 80, pt. II, ch. H, 1 23.
200. Id. pt. IV, ch. D, T 20.
201. Id. pt. IV, ch. C, ¶ 21 (citing VCLT art. 39).
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equivalence between Article 1105 and the IMS.202 The Merrill & Ring tribunal
was similarly inclined to understand the Interpretive Note as "closer to an
amendment of the treaty, than a strict interpretation."20 3 Notwithstanding these
holdouts, the widespread acceptance of the FTC's Interpretive Note as binding
illustrates the unrealized potential of joint agreements.
Once tribunals had agreed that Article 1105 prescribes the customary IMS,
the debate swiftly turned to what the IMS entailed. As it turned out, equating
FET to the IMS did not settle the controversy or add a great deal of specificity.
The El Paso tribunal observed that the IMS is "as little defined as the BIT's FET
standard."204 In particular, tribunals disagreed about the evolution of IMS. 2 05
Mondev held that Article 1105 incorporated customary international law (CIL)
206as of the time NAFTA came into force in 1994. ADF, meanwhile, subscribed
to the evolutionary view that CIL was "constantly in the process of
development."207 These shifting terms of interpretive drift around Article 1105
suggest that, left to their devices, tribunals will stumble upon-or even seek
out-further ambiguity in investment agreements. Because treaties are meant to
give effect to the intent of parties, there must be a continuing role for States in
the balance of interpretive authority. Who interprets is at least as important as
what specific treaty provision is being interpreted.
Highlighted by the example of the FTC's Interpretive Note are two
distinctions between different kinds of agreements by which States reserve and
exercise joint interpretive authority. The first is whether potential investors, as
third-party beneficiaries, are put on prior notice of binding joint interpretive
authority retained by States. Without such notice, States could, of course, make
subsequent agreements, but such agreements must merely be "taken into
account" under the VCLT. Reisman argues that
where the States-parties decide ex ante to reserve to themselves the power to change
the rights they are creating for the benefit of third parties, they put the universe of
potential third party beneficiaries on express notice that the States-parties have
retained this power and have not done so as a matter of State-State arbitration and
adjudication.
NAFTA Article 1131(2), which gave the FTC its authority to promulgate its
binding interpretive note in 2001, is a standard example of putting third-party
beneficiaries on requisite notice that parties have the authority to issue binding
interpretations-a constraint that is additive upon the rules of treaty
interpretation. The general rule on treaty interpretation, as laid out in the VCLT,
202. Pope & Talbot Phase 2 Award, supra note 131, ¶¶ 108-18.
203. Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P. v. Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/07/1,
Award, ¶ 192 (Mar. 31, 2010).
204. El Paso Award, supra note 108, ¶ 335.
205. Compare Waste Management, supra note 43; ADF Award, supra note 20; Mondev Award,
supra note 198; S.D. Myers Partial Award, supra note 121; and Glamis Gold Award, supra note 47. Only
Glamis Gold implied that the Neer standard still applies. That decision has been criticized by Judge
Schwebel. Stephen Schwebel, Is Neer Far from Fair and Equitable?, 27 ARB. INT'L 555 (2011).
206. Mondev Award, supra note 198, 1 91.
207. ADF Award, supra note 20, ¶ 179.
208. Reisman Ecuador-U.S. Expert Opinion, supra note 7, ¶ 29.
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does not put such third-party beneficiaries on sufficient notice that subsequent
agreements by States will inform the interpretation of the relevant treaty
provision; the VCLT merely suggests the possibility that it could. This feature
affords tribunals the discretion to reject non-binding interpretations.
Another relevant distinction is whether joint interpretations are established
ex ante (by necessity, in general terms) or ex post (in light of a particular dispute).
Although the Panama-Argentina joint interpretation and the FTC's Interpretive
Note were both ex ante joint interpretations made in general terms, States may
also rely on subsequent agreements to signal their shared intentions to tribunals
when an ongoing dispute implicates a textual ambiguity. Admittedly, joint
interpretations are likely to be regarded as more legitimate when they are not
established pursuant to an ongoing dispute. Some scholars have therefore
recommended against giving retrospective effect to joint interpretations so as to
preserve the stability of expectations.209 Indeed, the potential for abuse when
States may tip the interpretive scales in their own favor or in favor of a national
who is a current disputant is the reason why unilateral declarations by States are
not given the same effect under the VCLT.
Joint interpretations have a natural check against this: both States parties
must establish a shared intentionality before a joint interpretation is considered
to have been rendered. The Aguas del Tunari case offers an illustrative example:
in that dispute, both the Dutch and Bolivian governments independently
expressed the opinion that the BIT between their two countries did not apply to
the dispute. The tribunal nevertheless objected that the "coincidence of several
statements does not make them a joint statement" or a "subsequent
agreement."210 The tribunal emphasized the absence of "intent that these
statements be regarded as an agreement."211 The fact that at least one State party
must sign on to a joint interpretation that might be prejudicial to its own nationals
in an ongoing dispute should help legitimate ex post joint interpretations. For
example, in CME, dissatisfied with a partial award, the Dutch and Czech
governments engaged in consultations and published agreed-upon minutes,
recording their subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation of the Czech-
Dutch BIT. Helpfully, the BIT provided for the option to engage in bilateral
consultations "on any matter concerning the interpretation and application of the
Agreement."2 12 The tribunal then relied upon the agreed minutes in deliberations
for the final award.2 13
Binding joint interpretation provisions are increasingly common in "new-
209. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 13, at 216-17.
210. Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on
Respondent's Objections to Jurisdiction, 1 251 (Oct. 21, 2005).
211. Id.
212. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the




213. See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Final Award (UNCITRAL, 14 March
2003), $ 87-93.
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generation" investment treaties.214 U.S. investment treaty practice has
incorporated the following clause: "A joint decision of the Parties, each acting
through its representative designating for purposes of this Article, declaring their
interpretation of a provision of this Treaty shall be binding on a tribunal, and any
decision or award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that joint
decision."2 15 Other States are also increasingly concluding new-generation
investment agreements explicitly allowing for binding joint interpretations. 216in
tandem with its program of terminating BITs in 2016, India invited its remaining
twenty-five investment treaty counterparties to conclude Joint Interpretive
217Declarations (JIDs). The European Union and Canada issued a Joint
Interpretative Instrument on CETA, which includes a right to regulate provision,
an extensive list of "legitimate public policy objectives" in the preamble, and a
commitment to "review regularly the content of the obligation to provide fair and
equitable treatment, to ensure that it reflects their intentions . . . and that it will
not be interpreted in a broader manner than they intended."218
C. The Co-Construction ofMeaning in International Investment Law
If the law of treaty interpretation has always allowed for joint
interpretations, why are States dusting off the option now? One answer lies in
the growing pattern of powerful, formerly capital-exporting States wearing dual
hats as both capital-importers and capital-exporters. Their old impulse for
determinate, rigidly-interpreted investment treaties that favored their investor-
claimant nationals has given way to a self-protective awareness that they may
find themselves respondents in investment disputes. As disputes become more
numerous, States are also becoming keenly aware of their roles as repeat players.
Secondly, the epistemic community of international lawyers and adjudicators are
taking fresh stock of the role of subsequent agreements. In 2008, the
214. See RODRIGO POLANCO, THE RETURN OF THE HOME STATE TO INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES:
BRINGING BACK DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION? 103-18 (2019).
215. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., art. 30(3), Nov. 4,
2011, https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade Agreements/BIT/Uruguay/asset upload file748 9005.pdf;
2008 U.S.-Rwanda Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 30(3), supra note 181; 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty, art. 30(3), 2004, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/I 17601.pdf.
DR-CAFTA, supra note 150, arts. 10.22, 19.1;.
216. See, e.g., Agreement Between Canada and the Czech Republic for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, Can.-Czech, art. X(6), May 6, 2009, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.
org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/606/download; ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand
Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN-Aust., N.Z., art. 27(2), 27(3), Feb. 27, 2009, https://www.asean.
org/uploads/2012/10/Agreement/20Establishing%20the%20AANZFTA.pdf; Free Trade Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S. Kot., art. 11.22(3), June 30,
2007 https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/fmal-text; ACIA, supra note 160,
arts. 40(2), 40(3).
217. In November 2017, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government also approved a Joint
Interpretive Declaration concluded with Colombia in 2009. Government of India, Press Information
Bureau, Cabinet Approves Joint Interpretative Declaration between India and Colombia regarding the
Agreementfor the Promotion andProtection ofInvestment signed on November 10, 2009 (Nov. 10, 2017),
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=173390.
218. Joint Interpretative Declaration on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, Can.-EU, Oct. 23, 2016,
http://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Joint-declaration-10.10. 6.pdf.
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International Law Commission launched an effort to understand "treaties over
time," and, in 2013, it changed the topic's framing to focus more squarely on
"subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to interpretation of
,,219treaties". Finally, the FTC's Interpretive Note and other examples illustrate a
tried-and-tested form that allows durable reform by recapturing an interpretive
role for States, as opposed to static textual approaches by which States get
another pass at reworking their treaty commitments without reserving lasting
interpretive authority for themselves.
This historical gloss helps to explain the conundrum of timing: as
developed countries-which have now had their turns in the respondent's hot
seat-turn to reform, the stickiness of old-generation investment treaties is
beginning to give way to momentum for reform. It also brings the political
economy of the reform moment to the fore. This paper has described ISDS
reform largely as a response to an interpretive problem in investment law that is
captured by the unsettled nature of the legitimate expectations doctrine.
There is, of course, another explanation: traditionally capital-exporting
developed States are also increasingly recipients of foreign investment and,
consequently, the targets of investment claims. Because these States have the
diplomatic wherewithal and systemic importance to play an agenda-setting role
in the international investment regime, their new positions as potential
respondents has galvanized reform. Both explanations are highly compatible: as
the formerly capital-exporting architects of old-generation investment
instruments face liability as a result of interpretive uncertainty, they are using
their clout to manage interpretive authority and reasserting the newly salient
primacy of States, in whose names the investment regime exists.
The rise of joint interpretations and subsequent agreements speaks to the
resurgence of the State in investment law. As the ADF tribunal observed, "[W]e
have the Parties themselves-all the Parties-speaking to the Tribunal. No more
authentic and authoritative source of instruction on what the Parties intended to
convey in a particular provision ... is possible."22 0 The ADF tribunal gave a
second reason that is endemic to the decentralized nature of ISDS: subsequent
agreements are not only "a mechanism for correcting what the Parties themselves
become convinced are interpretative errors but also for consistency and
continuity of interpretation, which multiple ad hoc arbitral tribunals are not well
suited to achieve and maintain."221
Joint interpretations established through subsequent agreements and
practice invite understandable suspicion. The "golden rule" of treaty
interpretation in the Vienna Convention has always drawn veneration and
suspicion in equal measure.222 Simma has argued that "one can make
219. Subsequent Treaties and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Interpretation ofTreaties, INT'L
LAW COMM'N, http://1ega1.un.org/ilc/texts/1_11 .shtml; George Nolte, Int'l Law Comm'n, First Report on
Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty Interpretation, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/660 (2013).
220. ADF Award, supra note 20, ¶ 177.
221. Id.
222. See EDUARDO JIMNEZ DE ARtCHAGA, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE PAST THIRD OF A
CENTURY 43 (1978).
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interpretation arrive where one's preconceptions (Vorverstaendnis) of where the
treaty ought to prescribe want it to arrive, and then garnish the result with that
wonderful formula you find in art 31(1)."223 Mahnoush Arsanjani and Reisman
have also argued that, in interpreting treaties for the benefit of third parties,
where stability of (third-party) expectation is a cardinal value, "the quest for the
'shared' subjectivities of the many states that are involved in any place other than
the text of the agreement is a pursuit of the ignis fatuus. Reisman has
explained elsewhere that "[i]n treaties made to provide benefits to third parties
and, especially, to induce them to adjust their actions in reliance on the effective
provision of those benefits, the stability of those expectations is also critical to
the fulfillment of the objects and purposes of the treaties concerned."22 5
The understandable concern with returning interpretive authority to States
is that in the world of investment law, which is concerned with the time-
inconsistency problem created by immobile capital investments, uncertainty
breeds uncertainty. However, this concern is not sensitive either to the hurdles
that keep states from forming binding joint interpretations recklessly or to the
behavioral consequences of arbitrators and investors being put on notice of
binding interpretive authority ex ante. As the Aguas del Tunari example
illustrates, the threshold to finding that subsequent agreements and practice have
risen to the level of a binding joint interpretation is-and should be-high
enough as to create a presumption in favor of existing interpretations unless
States clearly evince agreement o the contrary. Although it remains within the
discretion of tribunals to consider subsequent agreements and practice regardless
of notice or form, States are much more likely to be able to both reassert control
(through binding joint interpretations) and maintain legitimacy (by putting
investors on notice) if they explicitly allow for joint interpretive authority in their
investment treaties, even if it might make credible commitment costlier ex ante.
The lurking presence of States' binding interpretive authority is also likely
to have a disciplining effect on arbitrators contemplating expansive
interpretations of treaty provisions and to be priced in by investors making
foreign investment decisions, regardless of whether States eventually end up
choosing to exercise that authority. If and when States do promulgate binding
joint interpretations, there is an unequivocal information-disclosing effect to
tribunals and investors that can be factored into the repeat game that participants
in the ISDS regime play. In these ways, binding joint interpretations-perhaps
in tandem with the juridical and quasi-legislative approaches discussed in Part
HILfacilitate the dialectic relationships that States, foreign investors, and the
epistemic community of arbitrators should share in the co-construction of
meaning in international investment law.
223. Simma, supra note 186, at 46.
224. Mahnoush Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, Interpreting Treaties for the Benefit of Third
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L. 597, 602 (2010).
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CONCLUSION
International investment law is being reconstituted. Through rose-tinted
glasses, ISDS apologists see a "complex adaptive system" in the midst of
experimentation, building gradually towards the regime's unrealized
226potential. For others, this moment of reform threatens to introduce "new
uncertainties into the law" 227 of investment arbitration and "[w]iping the slate
clean seems to be the only possible way forward." 
2 2 8
But uncertainty is endemic to the law, and the law of international
229investment is no different. This Note deconstructs the myth that investment
treaties are pacta in favorem tertii; rather, they are public international law's
solution to economic problems of time-inconsistency and credible commitment.
International investment law is finally homeward bound, but its return to its
sovereigntist roots is encumbered by role differentiation between creators (States
parties) and authoritative interpreters (arbitral tribunals). This Note has sought
to temper expectations about how much may be achieved by juridical self-
restraint or treaty reform alone while making a cautiously optimistic case for
binding joint interpretations to reclaim interpretive authority for the very States
in whose name the regime exists. After all, "[t]he most important thing . . . is
who interprets, not what is interpreted."230 Doctrines like legitimate expectations
fill gaps when tribunals must guess about the scope of the State's credible
commitment. Joint interpretations would keep tribunals from having to puzzle at
what States meant to say. States could-and very well should-simply tell us.
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